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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Among the Central European transition economies, Hungary was one of the 
firsts to reform its municipal system, to introduce rules accelerating the 
decentralisation process. Since 1990 the state administration was decentralized 
leaving a great deal of autonomy to the local self-governments.  
The Parliament guaranteed the independence of municipalities by several 
laws, among which the most important are the Constitution and Act LXV (1990) 
on local government. Based on these laws, municipalities have their own financial 
resources independent of centralised decisionmaking, they have the right to levy 
taxes, and they are free to decide on how this money is spent. The Act XXV (1996) 
on municipal bankruptcy regulates the processes to be followed in case a 
municipality is not able to meet its obligations. This law is still unique among the 
countries of the region. 
In Hungary, the public and private sectors are no longer separate .Due to 
their increasing deficit caused by vanishing state subsidies and privatisation, 
municipalities have been forced to involve the private sector into their investments.  
 
The biggest challenge of the coming years is whether municipalities will be 
able to meet the requirements set by the private sector, and whether the state can 
speed up the reforms that are still needed to make municipalities creditworthy. 
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The dissertation describes the structure of Hungarian municipal finance and 
the features of municipal investment activity in detail, gives a full picture of the 
revenue-raising possibilities, and also introduces the opinion of Hungarian and 
international researchers on the subject. It introduces a regression model that 
enables governmental decision-makers to assess municipal investment capability 
based on independent data, such as the amount of municipal loans, the size of the 
settlement, or the geographical location of the municipality. 
The regression equation provides an efficient tool in investment policy, as 
its determinants show which variable has a greater effect on the value of 
investments. By using the results of the analysis it would be possible to customise 
investment-enhancing programs, thereby making them suitable for the 
characteristics of a specific region. 
In Hungary, municipal investment has slowed, mainly due to financial 
reasons. As a consequence, the dissertation emphasises the financial side of 
investments. Based on Hungarian and international experience, we can expect an 
increase in outside financial resources in municipal investment, such as loans and 
private sector funding, as traditional financial resources, such as state subsidies and 
income from privatisation, are decreasing. In the dissertation I describe an 
institution that, by encouraging municipal credit market participation, would have a 
positive effect on investment activity. 
 
The methods of research 
Literature analysis 
The background of the research includes studies written by researchers at 
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the Public Policy Department of the University of Economics and Public 
Administration, the outcomes of international projects such as the Subnational 
Development Program,1 and international public policy literature from recent 
decades. 
Data analysis 
In 1995 the Social Research Institute (TARKI) started to develop a database 
on municipalities. It is based on a questionnaire sent out to each municipality every 
year. The average response rate has been about 35%. The data were weighed based 
on the municipal data of the Central Statistical Office (regional, settlement type and 
population) so that they represent the whole country. The first three questionnaires 
were almost identical and did not include questions about economic expectations. 
In 1999 and 2000 the revised questionnaires included questions about municipal 
budgets and economic expectations, making it possible to analyse the changes in 
the answers from one year to the next. Accordingly, this dissertation uses the data 
of 1999 and 2000, when the author also participated in designing the questionnaire 
and analysing the answers. 
The questionnaires and the main characteristics of the municipalities that 
answered the questionnaires can be seen in Appendix I. 
Modelling 
Through factor and regression analysis I define which variables depend on 
each other and to what extent, and further, which variable has an effect on the 
independent variable, the municipality’s rate of investment. The model makes it 
                                                 
1 A collaboration of the Canadian Urban Institute, the World Bank, the British Know-How 
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possible to assess the future impact of governmental decision-making in the field of 
municipal investments. Municipal data has not been examined this way in Hungary 
before. 
The hypotheses to be examined in the dissertation are as follows: 
1. Municipal credit market behaviour depends on the size of its budget, its 
geographical location and the number of inhabitants. 
2. Similar municipalities (same group, similar size, and same region) 
behave in a similar way when investing. 
3. Loans play an important role in investments made by smaller 
municipalities, although their acceptance in the credit market is low. 
4. Municipal investment behaviour is predictable if we know the 
municipality’s location, its tax base, its borrowing, and its budget. 
 
                                                                                                                                       
Fund, and the Open Society Institute. 
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2 THE HUNGARIAN MUNICIPAL SYSTEM  
2.1 The structure of the municipal system 
Act LXV (1990) on local governments created a new form of public 
administration, the essence of which is that the population of each municipality has 
the right to form a local self-government and to elect representatives empowered to 
make decisions independently from the central authorities.  
Hungary abandoned municipal hierarchy and vertical integrity of 
settlements, a practice of the previous political era, when bigger municipalities had 
greater rights and more political power, and upper tiers of the hierarchy were 
responsible over lower tiers. 
Like other post-socialist states, Hungary took the first steps towards 
creating a democratic administrative system, and moved from a centrally planned 
economy towards a market economy (Jenei, [2000]). 
 
Local self-government 
Under the new administrative system, all municipalities have the same basic 
rights. The obligations and rights of municipalities are regulated in the Act on local 
governments. The act makes it possible for a municipality to take over tasks from a 
higher tier, if the municipality is able to do so without adversely affecting the 
carrying out of its obligations. 
We see two exceptions in the system of „equal municipalities” -- one is the 
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status of cities with county rights, and the other is Budapest, the capital. 
The county capitals and cities with a population of over 50000 people may 
take over county responsibilities. 
The Act on local governments deals with the responsibilities of Budapest in 
a separate chapter, due to its special status. 
 
The county level 
We can distinguish among three organs at the county level: the county 
government, the county administrative office, and special administrative bodies. 
The county governments have little power compared to their situation 
before 1990. They are responsible for tasks that can only be carried out at a higher 
level than municipalities, and even in those cases, the municipality can take these 
tasks over, if it has the necessary capacity. It is important to note that the county 
government can not raise revenues on its own.  
The county administrative office represents the central government at the 
county level.   It consists of the regional offices of the ministries, and its task is to 
carry out regional administrative tasks (for example the tax offices). 
The special administrative bodies, such as the labour office or the regional 
development councils, also carry out administrative tasks. The difference is that 
these tasks also require the co-operation of the non-governmental sector. 
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2.2 Size of municipalities, economies of scale 
Hungarian municipalities – with an average population of 4000 -- are smaller 
than municipalities in most OECD countries, although we can find even more 
fragmented systems in France and Switzerland. When talking about the size 
of municipalities, we have to add what responsibilities a particularly sized 
municipality has to fulfil.  
If we consider both, we can say that Hungarian municipalities have greater 
responsibilities than other municipalities of the same size in the OECD 
countries. This raises the question of economies of scale. 
Many small settlements, although obliged to collect and treat waste water and 
garbage, are not able to fulfil such responsibilities and are not able to carry 
out the necessary investments on their own. 
The literature suggests three possible solutions for this problem. One is 
encouraging the formation of associations of municipalities.  The second is creating 
notary districts, and the third is the amalgamation of municipalities. 
 
2.2.1 Municipal association versus amalgamation 
The joint establishment of municipal associations is a well-known idea and 
practice for Hungarian municipalities. When certain tasks are carried out for larger 
numbers of people, the per capita cost decreases. This is typically true for services 
where the constant costs are high, such as garbage and sewage treatment and gas 
investments. 
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In many countries with fragmented municipal systems, in order to reach 
economies of scale, municipalities are obliged to carry out tasks together or to form 
associations.  
Table 1. illustrates the average population of municipalities in the EU 
countries.  
The increase in the number of inhabitants not only decreases the average 
cost of a service, but has advantages in other areas of municipal management as 
well, such as by decreasing the administrative cost of the municipality. Smaller 
municipalities normally operate with higher administrative costs per capita, which, 
as the number of inhabitants increases, decrease faster than other costs (for 
example the cost of control) increase. 
Table 1. Population data of municipalities in the EU countries  
 Number of 
municipalities 
Average 
population 
Number of 
municipalities 
before 
amalgamation 
Rate of 
decrease 
Austria 2 301 3 400 3 500 (1970) 34 % 
Belgium 589 17 200  
Denmark2 275 19 100 1 391 80% 
Finland 455 11,200  
France 36,559 1,600  
Greece 5,922 1,800  
Holland 636 27,000 1,050 (1950) 39% 
Ireland *  
Luxembourg 118 3,400  
Great Britain *  
Germany 16,121 5,000  
Germany 8512 24,000 (1965) 65% 
                                                 
2 In Denmark, for example, the principal criterion when creating the municipal and county 
levels was the optimal size of units for efficiently providing services, such as education 
and healthcare. 
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(Laender) 
Italy 8,104 7,000  
Portugal 275 34,200  
Spain 8,082 4,800  
Sweden 288 30,900 2,500 (1950) 88% 
* As the different tiers overlap each other, the calculation of this data is not possible 
Source: DEXIA – Credit local de France – Credit local de Belgium. [1999]: Local Finance 
in the Fifteen Countries of the European Union. DEXIA. Belgium. pp. 26 - 29. 
 
Forced amalgamation, of course, also has negative effects.  
One disadvantage of increasing the size of municipalities is that citizens are 
further removed from decision making, meaning that their possibility of 
influencing it decreases. This argument was frequently used by politicians against 
the practice of amalgamation. 
In Hungary, the strongest impediment against forced amalgamation is the 
bad memory of the council system. Forced co-operation among municipalities 
deprived small villages of services such as elementary education. 
Although creating bigger units often means reaching economies of scale, 
creating big units might have the negative effect of over-using a service. This is 
summarised by the spillover effect. If a service is used by more than the optimal 
number, the quality of the service decreases. Typical examples are education and 
healthcare. 
Finally, the more people using a service, the more difficult it is to satisfy 
personal requirements, which is the opposite of the idea of the „customer driven 
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municipality”. The quality of a service is better, the closer it is to the customer.3 
2.2.2 Types of municipal associations 
In Hungary, forced amalgamation could not come into practice because of 
the historical background of the municipalities, but since 1994 it has been possible 
to create free municipal associations for special purposes.  These municipal 
associations are favoured by the state subsidy system, such that a municipality that 
is a member of an association will receive more money towards carrying out a 
particular task than it would receive if it did not belong to an association. 
 
The following types of associations exist:  
• The most common form of association occurs when the representative 
body of a municipality agrees with another municipality that an office of 
the latter will perform tasks or services for it. The contract between the 
two municipalities must be very detailed, especially about the sharing of 
costs.  
• Two or more municipalities can agree that the institution of one can act 
on behalf of the others. This form of co-operation is much stronger than 
the one above, because one institution represents common interests, and 
each of the other municipalities must transfer some of its rights to the 
acting one. 
                                                 
3 Huther and Shah (1998) created an index for measuring “good governance”. Countries 
with a result below 40 points have “bad governance”, while those above 50 points have 
good governanace. Switzerland received 75 points, Hungary received 54 points. (Huther 
and Shah, 1998. pp 7.) 
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• Two or more municipalities may decide to create a common decision-
making body, to co-manage an institution, or to employ people 
commonly. The main difference between this and the previous ones is 
that in this case, the rights do not belong to one member of the 
association, but to an institution, office, etc. created for the specific 
purpose.  
• Two or more municipalities can form an association with independent 
legal personality that is therefore able to take on obligations in its own 
name (not through the members) and raise its own revenues (not only 
funded through transfers from the members). Apart from a co-operation 
agreement, this form also requires a founding charter. 
• Local government associations can have regular working relations with 
other local government associations or legal entities. These relations can 
take many forms, as laws do not regulate them. 
Since 1996, according to Act XXI (1996) on regional development, 
municipalities can create regional development associations in order to co-
ordinate their development plans or to establish shared funds for 
development purposes. 
 
The central government’s tool for encouraging municipal associations is not 
to give them direct subsidies, but to threaten them with less if they are not 
associated with one. If the number of recipients of a particular service does not 
reach a level set by the government, the municipality is not eligible for a subsidy. 
Municipalities can be members of more than one association, if their 
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responsibilities require. Of course, these multiple member associations are more 
complicated to administer, which is one impediment to their establishment. 
The questionnaire sent to the municipalities by TARKI in 2000 contained 
questions about why local governments form associations. Fifty-two percent of 
municipalities said that their main reason to form an association was the lower 
management and operating cost of services. Seventy percent of them said that the 
reason was that investment costs are lower, and for 76% of municipalities, the most 
important reason for forming associations was the higher success rate at subsidy 
applications. It seems that although municipalities realised that carrying out 
responsibilities together with other municipalities means rationalising long-term 
costs, their main incentive to co-operate is minimising starting investment costs.  
Figure 1. illustrates that investments with high starting costs are typically 
carried out by associations. 
Figure 1. Municipalities making investment plans in 2000 as a percentage of all 
municipalities 
Source: Izabella Barati. [2000]: Municipal data in 2000. TÁRKI. Budapest. pp. 14. 
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2.2.3 Notary districts  
Currently, there are 593 notary districts in Hungary, established by 1003 
municipalities. According to paragraph 39 of the Act on local governments:  
• Neighbouring municipalities with less that one thousand inhabitants can 
create notary districts for the purpose of fulfilling their administrative 
responsibilities. A municipality’s share of the costs of such a district is in 
proportion to the number of its inhabitants unless agreed otherwise. 
• Municipalities with fewer than one thousand inhabitants may maintain 
independent administrative offices if they are able to appoint a notary 
meeting the qualification requirements set by law. 
The reason to create notary districts is to effectively fulfil administrative 
responsibilities.  
The higher the number of inhabitants within a notary district, the higher the 
amount of central government subsidies. 
 
2.2.4 The legal status of municipal associations 
When talking about municipal associations, a question to be discussed is 
their legal status, that is, whether they are a body of municipalities, or they 
represent a new governmental tier.  
If we accept the first version, i. e. that they are bodies of municipalities, 
(functional regionalism (Péteri - Davey, [1998])), then the financing mechanisms 
are not properly regulated. Their right of levying taxes is questionable, and they 
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can get central subsidies only through their members. (The member municipality 
applies for it and then transfers the money to the association.) This point is crucial 
when applying for investment loans. Without a steady revenue source such 
associations are not creditworthy. 
The other possibility is to view them as a separate, formal governmental 
tier. It could follow the old territorial structure (county, smaller units), but could 
also be a new level, independent from the old structure.  
 
Table 2 summarises the positive sides of the two alternatives.  
Table 2. The advantages of forms of regionalization 
Functional regionalism Formal governmental tier 
More flexible system 
Individual needs ⇒ 
„competition” is strong 
More suitable for Hungarian traditions 
(citizens’ participation) 
Equality 
Equal treatment of needs 
No exemptions 
Could be a tool for macro-stabilisation 
Enhanced administrative effectiveness 
Source: Kopányi et al. [2001]: Hungary. Modernising the Subnational Government 
System. The World Bank. 417. Discussion paper. Washington, DC pp 5. 
 
2.2.5 The future role of municipal associations 
Given that the EU favours bigger units to smaller ones through its subsidy 
policy, the role of Hungarian municipal associations might change in the future. In 
EU practice, municipal associations are not rare; municipalities are often obliged to 
co-operate or – as we saw in Table 1 - even amalgamate.  
In the American practice, „associations” can levy taxes, which, if possible 
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in Hungary, would be one more incentive for creating associations.  
Although associations will not levy taxes in the near future, they can issue 
bonds for financing common investments.4 The repayment of the loan would be 
secured by the revenue stream generated by the investment (revenue bond). 
                                                 
4 According to Hungarian laws, municipalities actually can levy taxes, if they create a 
common representative body, and transfer their tax-levying right to it. If municipalities 
would accept this practice, it would radically change the financing methods of investments, 
and would increase the use of loan types, such as general obligation bonds.  Chapter VI 
deals with the different bond types in detail. 
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3 DELEGATING AND FINANCING MUNICIPAL TASKS 
Among municipal systems, we can differentiate between Nordic and 
southern type systems. The Nordic type describes bigger municipalities with more 
responsibilities, while the southern type describes smaller municipalities with 
fewer responsibilities. The Hungarian system does not fit either category, as 
according to the municipality size it is closer to the southern, but according to the 
municipal responsibilities, it is closer to the Nordic type system. 
One way of measuring the decentralisation of a country is to look at what 
level is responsible for what kind of services. 
According to Musgrave (1984) there are three main types of public services 
--  allocation, redistribution and stabilisation -- the latter two of which are better 
kept at the central level.  
Municipal systems with small autonomous municipalities face the specific 
problem of the transboundary effects of services. This problem exists in Hungary. 
It means that the effect of a public service in one municipality may be a negative or 
positive externality for another settlement, which did not ask for the effect, did not 
pay for it, or was not compensated for the harm caused by it. 
These are called spillover effects. In order to minimise these effects, 
services should be delegated to the lowest level that is able to manage it, and where 
most affected people can express their wishes. (Huther- Shah [1998] pp. 10., Shah 
[1994].) This is also expressed by the subsidiarity principle. 
There are three forms of dividing tasks between the levels of government.  
 26  
- Pure separation means the lower level fulfils its responsibilities 
independently from the higher ones, and has discretional decision-
making rights that the state has no control over.  
- Shared responsibility is when the upper and lower tiers co-operate when 
carrying out certain tasks.  
- Official relationship is when the lower tier is obliged to carry out 
programs supervised and designed by the upper tiers. 
 
In Hungary, the responsibility for most functions is shared among the 
governmental tiers, and when delegating tasks to the lower levels, the subsidiarity 
principal is taken into account. 
As a consequence, the county is only responsible for tasks that satisfy the 
needs of more than one settlement, but at the same time, if a settlement is able to 
provide the service, it can take it over from the county. 
The potential hazard of this practice is that the county is often left with the 
most expensive tasks to carry out, such as maintaining hospitals. In the light of the 
fact that the revenue raising capacity of the county is limited, this problem requires 
special attention from the central government. 
 
3.1 Settlement and regional development, as a complex municipal task 
Settlement development means investments that have major importance to 
the lives of the inhabitants of a particular settlement. Settlement development is 
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one layer of regional development, one element of the system. 
Settlement development itself is a complex system if we take into account 
the complexity of tasks to be carried out, as it comprises the simultaneous solution 
of environmental, technical, and economic problems. In the municipal 
documentation it is represented by the following: 
- The municipality has a long term (3-5-10 years) development plan; 
- The investment plan matches the financial and loan raising plans; 
- The technical parameters in the technical development plan and the land 
use plan are in accordance with the above plans. (Horváth M. – Szirmai 
[2000], McAully [1999]). 
Another layer of this complexity is represented by the number of actors 
needed in settlement development. The development process requires the 
involvement of a growing number of actors from the private and non-governmental 
sector, and the involvement of churches in services. This process can be “caught” 
in the continuous increase of the amount of budget line “subsidies and other 
transfers”, as this amount is for covering the work done by them. 
The different forms of private sector involvement in public services are 
dealt with in detail in chapter IV. 
The third element of complexity is that these layers must be built upon each 
other. The municipal, county and state development plans must be in accordance 
with each other. In order to reach this “harmony”, and avoid conflicting plans, the 
state uses a very sophisticated co-ordinating and subsidy system. (Horváth M. - 
Szirmai [2000], Csefkó [2000]) 
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3.1.1 The institutions of regional development 
As a consequence of history, transport development, and different natural 
environment the differences among the regions in Hungary are great, despite the 
small size of the country. Budapest has always been far ahead of the “rural areas”, 
which became a serious problem after World War I, when a great part of the 
territory, and so the regional centres, were cut off from the country. 
 In different density of population, we can catch the remnants of the Turkish 
era in Hungary. In the territory not occupied by the Turks – South-Trans- Danube 
and the northern and eastern part of the Great Plain – the population of villages is 
below 1000, but villages are close to each other, while on the Great Plain, the 
population of villages is typically between 5-10,000, and villages are far from each 
other. 
The differences in the size of the settlements have determined the future 
development of regions ever since. 
After 1945 the small villages, being at the bottom of the settlement-
hierarchy, were deprived from development funds. 
Central development plans only considered sectoral, industrial perspectives, 
while regional differences were ignored. In 1971, the “National Settlement 
Development Concept and Regional Development Principles” ended this practice, 
but they still did not solve the problem of the already declining regions. It was a 
town development concept, supposing that towns, as centres of development, will 
have a positive effect on their rural surroundings. 
As a consequence, the biggest challenge of settlement and regional 
development is still the treatment of regional interrelations. 
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Settlements can form regional development associations (talked about in 
detail in chapter II), the purpose of which is to create common funds, co-ordinated 
programs, etc. Regional development municipal associations are represented by 
one appointed member in the county regional development councils.  
County regional development councils were formed in 1996. These are 
special bodies working at the county level, with the purpose of representing 
national regional development goals and co-ordinating the different county 
development plans. 
The set-up of the county regional development councils illustrates that 
regional development is not only the responsibility of the state, but requires the co-
ordination of several actors.  
Members of the county regional development council include: 
- The chairman of the county government assembly; 
- The mayors of the cities with delegated county rights; 
- Representative of the Minister of Environment; 
- Representatives of chambers of commerce from the county; 
- Representatives of the municipal regional development associations 
from the county (one for each statistical micro region in the county); 
- Representatives of the labour council from the county (one for the 
employer and one for the employee side). 
The county regional development council reviews each micro region’s 
development plan. Of course, there is no hierarchical relationship among the plans, 
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but those not matching the county’s preferences will not receive county funds. 
The next level of development is the level of the regions. Two or more 
county regional development councils can establish a regional regional 
development council in order to treat problems that require larger capacities than 
exist in a single county.  
Creating regional regional development councils is not obligatory, except 
for the Budapest and the Balaton regions, but a good reason for creating them is 
that these units will receive the highest subsidies from the European Structural and 
Cohesion Funds (Beluszky [2000]). 
The Hungarian regions are illustrated in figure 2. 
Figure 2. Regions and counties in Hungary 
Source: www.ksh.hu, the homepage of the Central Statistical Office 
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3.2 Financial sources for fulfilling responsibilities 
When decisions are made about financial questions - such as which 
governmental level collects what kinds of revenues, which ones of them will be 
earmarked and which ones will not, to what level they will be redistributed, etc. -- 
the efficiency of the system is also determined. 
It is generally true that the higher the local income (fees and taxes) in the 
municipal budget, the more responsibilities are delegated to the local level, and 
vice versa. 
The Hungarian system on this point is controversial, because a wide range 
of services is delegated to the local level with a relatively low income. 
The Hungarian Constitution and the Act on local governments also contain 
provisions on the financial resources that the state should provide when delegating 
a service to the local level.  As the two laws do not use the same wording, it is 
possible to use each of them to support certain arguments. According to the 
Constitution, the state should provide the “necessary” funding, while according to 
the Act on local governments, the state should provide the “sufficient” financial 
sources with the delegated service. 
In my understanding, the state should provide the possibility and capacity 
for the municipality to raise local revenues for a specific service, e.g., through taxes 
and fees, but should not guarantee the revenue itself. So the state does not have to 
finance a local service up to 100%, but has to enable the municipality to raise funds 
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for it. This is in accordance with the European Charter on Local Self-Government5, 
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and this is the rule in most developed countries. 
3.2.1 Local revenues versus state transfers 
Public finance literature agrees on two reasons for increasing the proportion 
of the municipal budget raised through its own revenue. One is the “fiscal”, the 
other is the “accountability” argument. (Bahl, [2000]). 
I. The first reasons that central governments facing tight budget 
constraints, in order to solve their own deficit problems, will 
decrease the amount of transfers to the local level. The decrease in 
the transfers increases the local deficit, which can be solved by 
raising local income. If a municipality has local revenue sources, it 
is less vulnerable against changes in the central transfer policy. A 
typical action of a government that faces a deficit is to decrease 
transfers, rather than to take over the collection of local taxes.  
Moreover, where there are shared taxes, the state is likely to increase 
those taxes that it does not have to share with the local level. 
II. The accountancy argument refers to the transparency of the way the 
budget is spent. Local investments are financed from taxes that 
constituents pay directly or indirectly into the local budget. If 
constituents pay the money into the central budget, its route is 
difficult to follow, but if they pay it into the local budget, the local 
representatives are directly accountable. The higher the share of 
money paid into the local budget, the more power the taxpayer 
wants to exercise over local decision making.  
The following can be added as a third argument: 
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III. When a municipality increases its local revenues, it also raises its 
fiscal capacities, as it will possess discretional revenue and will 
become independent from central decisions. This has a positive 
effect on the municipality’s credit rating, making other revenue 
sources, such as loans, available. 
3.3 The Hungarian municipalities’ own revenues 6 
The municipalities’ own revenues, based on accounting rules and economic 
principles, can be further divided into current operational revenues and investment 
revenues. 
 
Current operational revenues are as follows: 
1. Revenues of municipal institutions,  
2. Rental fees,  
3. Revenue from interest, 
4. Business income,  
5. Local taxes and duties, 
6. Environmental and monument protection fines. 
 
Investment revenues are: 
1. The income from selling buildings and other property, 
2. The income from municipal investments  
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3. The income from selling shares and bonds, 
4. The income from financial investments  
5. The income from selling flats, 
6. Privatisation revenue,  
7. Income from selling other property rights. (Dr. Schimdt – Kadók – 
Herneczky [1996]). 
A general rule is that current expenses cannot be financed from investment income 
because this would lead to using up the municipality’s property. 
3.4 Local tax system  
3.4.1 The parameters for evaluating the local tax system 
When designing a local tax system, several questions must be answered to 
help in choosing among the possibilities, e. g., how broad the discretion of the 
settlements should be, what the historical background for implementing a special 
tax is, etc.  
 
There are five parameters based on which we can compare, and choose 
among, local taxes7. 
 
1) Efficiency. 
An efficient tax will have no effect on economic decisions. A tax cannot 
be 100 % efficient, but the goal should be that the tax will have the least 
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possible distortion on the price of the services and goods, and will have the 
least possible impact on the amount consumed.8 
2) Fairness. 
One can speak about horizontal or vertical equalisation. The first means 
that people in the same situation pay the same tax. Vertical equity is very 
difficult to achieve. This latter means that the better-off are taxed more heavily 
than the worse-off. This can be reached by very complicated redistributive, 
equalisation systems. 
3) The cost of tax administration. 
This cost should not be higher than the benefit deriving from its 
collection. Each tax imposes extra costs on their payers by the necessary audits, 
accounting, record-keeping, billing, collection, enforcement, etc.) These costs 
should be minimised. 
4) The possibility of tax competition. 
When a tax is levied on a mobile base, taxpayers will have an incentive 
to move to a settlement with a lower tax rate. This is a “catch 22”, because the 
municipality is left without a tax base, and the municipality that attracted the 
taxpayer with the lower rate will not be able to raise taxes because it would lose 
its attractiveness. This process will go on until the average tax rate is so low 
that it is not even efficient to collect it. (The administration costs will be high 
compared to the benefits.) 
5) The possibility of exporting the tax. 
When a municipality has the possibility of taxing non-residents, it will 
do so. This happens when a municipality taxes those activities that are able to 
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pass the tax to consumers from other jurisdictions. 
 
3.4.2 Local taxes in Hungary 
In 1991, the new local tax law came into force (Act C of 1990 On local 
taxes), and it has been amended by the Parliament almost every year since. 
According to the law, local governments have discretion to decide if they want to 
levy local taxes or not, and at what rate.  
The Act on local taxes describes the tax types (the objects and payers of the 
tax) and the maximum level of tax a municipality can levy.  
Local decrees about taxation must contain provisions about the following issues: (i) 
who is the taxpayer, (ii) what is the basis of the tax, (iii) exemptions, (iv) the rate of 
the tax, (v) the conditions of beginning and ending tax obligations.  
Finally, local taxes in Hungary should be evaluated according to the above 
criteria. 
In Hungary there are three main local taxes9 -- the business turnover tax, the 
communal tax and the property tax. The personal income tax is not a real local tax, 
it is a shared tax, but it is a good example to illustrate how a municipality can 
become defenceless against central decisions if the right of setting rates and shares 
is at the central level. 
 
1. The business turnover tax. The base of the business turnover tax is 
mobile, and as a consequence it can be “exported” into other settlements 
where the tax rate is lower, thus inducing tax competition. This tax fails 
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almost every criterion mentioned above. Besides being exportable and 
inducing tax competition, it has a negative impact on economic activity, 
distorts prices and is sensitive to economic cycles. It is often transferred 
to the consumers of the product of the taxed business, making them pay 
indirectly for the improvements that only a small circle of the 
consumers enjoy (those living where the company pays the tax). It also 
has a very negative psychological effect -- taxpayers often feel that it is 
a kind of a “punishment”, although they are the ones bringing work 
possibilities into the settlements10. It is also not independent from the 
changes of the central government’s economic policy.  
2. The communal tax. The Hungarian Communal Tax is a head tax (levied 
on a per capita base, a typical form of lump-sum tax). Although 60% of 
municipalities have introduced it, the communal tax income represents 
only 2% of municipal budgets. The local public finance literature often 
treats this tax as the appropriate form for internalising the congestion 
costs that residents impose on each other.  However it is very regressive. 
3. The tax on improvements on real estate  
This tax is paid by owners of buildings. The basis of the tax is either the 
market value or the area (size) of the property, as defined in the 
municipal decree. Based on the experiences of the developed world, the 
“ideal” local tax is the property tax. It is not exportable, is not sensitive 
to economic cycles, and is best administered by the local government 
since it requires identification of each parcel of land, improvement, and 
change in ownership. This is the tax that produces the most stable 
income for the municipality, which has a very positive impact on 
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improving creditworthiness. But it has some disadvantages as well.  For 
example the valuation of property is not an exact science but an art 
(Bird, 1999). It is very unpopular being the only tax the taxpayers 
directly face. 
 
3.5 Fees for services 
Unlike user fees, taxes are mandatory levies that are not directly linked to 
specific services. Rather, they serve redistributive purposes.  
User fees are linked to specific services, and they can be narrowly defined 
as charges levied on consumers of goods and services. Public finance literature 
suggests that they should be used as broadly as possible, although their use has 
some practical constraints. (Barati – Szalai [1999]).  
 
1.) They are rarely efficient. 
Efficiency means that they are equal to the real marginal cost, which is 
extremely difficult to define. The opportunity cost11 and the social cost 
of an activity should be considered when deciding the charge levied on 
consumers. 
2.) Positive side effects. 
When an activity has positive side effects (positive externality), local 
governments like to subsidise this activity in order to encourage it. 
3.) Non-excludable public services. 
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There are many non-excludable public services, that is, those that the 
non-payers cannot be excluded from the use of. In these cases, financing 
from taxes is more adequate than financing from fees. 
 
3.6 Transfers from the central government 
3.6.1 Grants and normatives 
The literature of decentralisation pays a lot of attention to the question of 
intergovernmental grants, the main reason being that the aim of transfers is to 
create a balance between the different regions’ incomes and expenditures, as 
municipal responsibilities have to be fulfilled everywhere. The main question is 
whether it is possible to design a grants system that strikes a balance between the 
expenditure needs and the allocation of revenues.  
 
The main forms of grants are (i) unconditional (general) grants, (ii) 
conditional non-matching grants and (iii) matching grants. 
I. Unconditional (general) grants. The central government supports the 
municipality without any condition concerning the use of the grant. 
This type of transfer gives the most autonomy to municipalities, and 
is most in accordance with Article 9 of the European Charter on 
Local Self-Government.  
The European Charter of Local Self Governments 
Article 9 
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 1 Local authorities shall be entitled, within national economic policy, to 
adequate financial resources of their own, of which they may dispose freely 
within the framework of their powers. 
 2 Local authorities' financial resources shall be commensurate with the 
responsibilities provided for by the constitution and the law.  
 3 Part at least of the financial resources of local authorities shall derive 
from local taxes and charges of which, within the limits of statute, they have 
the power to determine the rate. 
 4 The financial systems on which resources available to local authorities 
are based shall be of a sufficiently diversified and buoyant nature to enable 
them to keep pace as far as practically possible with the real evolution of the 
cost of carrying out their tasks. 
 5 The protection of financially weaker local authorities calls for the 
institution of financial equalisation procedures or equivalent measures which 
are designed to correct the effects of the unequal distribution of potential 
sources of finance and of the financial burden they must support. Such 
procedures or measures shall not diminish the discretion local authorities may 
exercise within their own sphere of responsibility. 
 6 Local authorities shall be consulted, in an appropriate manner, on the 
way in which redistributed resources are to be allocated to them. 
 7 As far as possible, grants to local authorities shall not be earmarked for 
the financing of specific projects. The provision of grants shall not remove the 
basic freedom of local authorities to exercise policy discretion within their 
own jurisdiction.  
 8 For the purpose of borrowing for capital investment, local authorities 
shall have access to the national capital market within the limits of the law. 
 
II. Conditional non-matching grants. This is an earmarked grant; the 
municipality can only use it for specific purposes. Its effect is 
smaller than the central government often expects due to substitution 
mechanisms - the expenditures that the municipality used for that 
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purpose before the grant become free to be spent on another 
program. The municipality can reduce its efforts in the area of 
grants. This type of transfer is the most appropriate method for local 
governments to meet national standards regardless of their revenue 
capacity. 
III. Matching grants. Sub-national governments are required to 
contribute to a subsidised program. A typical form of matching 
grants is partial cost reimbursement, which can be a very effective 
tool convenient to the central government as it can direct municipal 
spending by lowering the local „price” of services.  
 
Table 3 summarises the different grant types. 
 Table 3. Grant types and their objectives 
Grant Objective  Grant Design  Better Practices  Practices to avoid 
Bridge fiscal gap  Reassign 
responsibilities 
Tax abatement 
Tax base sharing 
Tax abatement in 
Canada and tax base 
sharing in Canada, 
Brazil and Pakistan 
Deficit grants, Tax by 
tax sharing as In India 
Reduce regional fiscal 
disparities 
General Non-matching 
Fiscal capacity 
equalisation transfers 
Fiscal equalisation 
programs of Australia, 
Canada and Germany 
General revenue 
sharing with multiple 
factors 
Compensate for benefit 
spillovers 
Open-ended matching 
transfers with matching 
rate consistent with 
spillout of benefits 
RSA grant for teaching 
hospitals 
 
Setting national 
minimum standards 
Conditional non-
matching block 
transfers with 
conditions on standards 
of service and access 
Indonesia roads and 
primary education 
grants, 
Colombia and Chile 
education transfers 
Conditional transfers 
with conditions on 
spending alone  
Ad hoc grants 
Influencing local 
priorities in areas of 
high national but low 
local priority 
Open-ended matching 
transfers (with 
preferably matching 
rate to vary inversely 
with fiscal capacity) 
Matching transfers for 
social assistance as in 
Canada 
Ad hoc grants 
Stabilisation capital grants provided Limit use of capital Stabilisation grants 
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maintenance possible grants and encourage 
private sector 
participation by 
providing political and 
policy risk guarantee 
with no future upkeep 
requirements 
Source: Shah [1994], Shah [1998], Boadway, Roberts and Shah [1994 pp. 11-24.] 
 
3.6.2 The current Hungarian grant system 
Municipal income consists of a municipality’s own revenues, shared taxes 
and central subsidies. In Hungary, the most important revenues coming from the 
central level are the targeted grants, the purpose of which is to direct investment 
sources into areas preferred by the central government. 
This chapter discusses mostly the central subsidies for investment purposes, 
but before going into detail, it is worth having a look at some data that describe the 
relationship between the central and the local budget, and help to draw final 
conclusions. 
The Hungarian municipal sector represents 12% of the state budget, which 
is equal to the figure in the Scandinavian countries. The difference is that 
Scandinavian municipalities have much more freedom when deciding about the 
spending of this money than their Hungarian counterparts, showing the greater 
degree of decentralisation of the Scandinavian states.  
If we look at the other side of the picture -- the share of centrally distributed 
money in local budgets -- we see that these subsidies represent a continuously 
decreasing share of the budget (Figure 3.) 
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Figure 3. The share of centrally distributed money in the local budget between 
1994 and 2001.  
Source: Ministry of Finance in Hungary. Department of Local Governments and Regional 
Development [2003.] 
As we see, the last decade can be characterised by the decrease of central 
subsidies, especially the decrease of the normative grants, that are for financing 
current expenditures. For calculating the sum of the normative grant, we need an 
indicator and a per unit cost element. The cost elements are the same for every 
municipality. The indicators usually reflect the “load” measurement, e. g., number 
of children in school, that is a characteristic of the municipality.  
The “other transfers” can be used for investment purposes. If the 
municipality does not spend the whole amount, it has to pay the remainder back 
into the state budget.  
3.6.3 Investment subsidies  
There are three kinds of investment subsidies in Hungary. These are (i) 
targeted subsidies, (ii) decentralized subsidies and (iii) subsidies for regional 
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equalisation.  
3.6.3.1 Targeted subsidies 
Targeted grants are given for large investments satisfying regional needs 
with an investment cost above 200 million HUF. Municipalities with investments 
that correspond to priority goals set by the Parliament automatically receive this 
grant. 
The investment grant is a tool for the central government to influence 
municipal plans. Sometimes it is viewed as a negative thing, but it also has positive 
effects. Regional investments should be done in a rational way, and the central 
level can set the development plans for the regions by choosing the targets of the 
subsidy in a way that corresponds to the technical phases of multi-year programs.12  
Furthermore, if a municipality applies for international grants, it will 
probably be more successful if the national government also support its plans with 
the targeted grants.  
3.6.3.2 Decentralized targeted grants 
Decentralized targeted grants are similar to targeted grants, but they appear 
in the sectoral ministries’ budgets. Municipalities have to apply for these grants at 
the County Regional Development Centres.  The purpose of these grants is to 
develop rural areas, create jobs and diminish the differences in regional 
development. One criteria when evaluating applications for these grants is whether 
the proposal helps to fulfil accession requirements and whether the program fits 
into the county regional development concept.  
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3.6.3.3 Development grants for regional equalisation 
Municipalities can apply for these grants for human and infrastructure 
investments. Their purpose is to develop the infrastructure of underdeveloped 
regions with a high unemployment rate. 
 
The committees managing the different grants co-operate with each other13. 
This means that if a municipality applies for several grants for the same 
investment, it is enough to submit the application once, to the place from which it 
is applying for the highest amount. 
According to the TARKI database for 2000, about 80% of municipalities 
expected that in the future it would be more difficult to access grant money. 
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4 THE INVESTMENTS AND THEIR FINANCING 
4.1 The investments to be made 
It is without question that investment costs of the Hungarian government 
sector will grow in the coming years, especially in the environmental sector.  
There is a big gap between the environmental and infrastructural situations 
of the current and future member countries of the European Union. In order to 
reduce this gap, according to the co-operation agreement with the EU, Hungary has 
to improve its infrastructural and environmental situation. According to 
conservative calculations, in the environmental sector alone some 6,8-7,6 billion 
euros will have to be spent in order to solve the problems (Kerekes – Kiss [1998] 
pp 23.). 
On the other hand, it is not only the EU that urges these improvements. 
They are necessary in order to avoid future environmental problems, and the level 
of services is not sustainable with the current physical infrastructure. The 
decentralisation process also pushes local governments to make these 
developments.  
 
The different sectors face the following challenges: 
In the water and sewage sector, due to the continuous underdevelopment of 
the past, decaying pipes are causing most of the problems. Sewage collection and 
treatment are also in bad shape, such that especially in small municipalities we can 
expect big investments. Illegal sewage disposal also causes many problems.  
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It was typical that prices were continuously set under the costs of the 
service, which led to over-consumption, and to a decrease in the efficiency of the 
service. As this service was delegated to the local level, market principles did not 
gain much attention until now. Including the private sector into the sewage and 
water sector would diminish a part of the problems cited above, as rates would 
slowly reach market levels. The next problematic area is garbage collection and 
treatment, where we can find problems similar to those of the water and sewage 
service. The underdevelopment of the past caused serious water and soil 
contamination, which raises health problems. The hazardous wastes of industrial 
firms cause special problems. Garbage dumps are becoming full and opening new 
ones has proven to be a political decision because of the opposition of citizens. 
Most of the money in this sector will be spent on modernising and building new 
dumps.  
The next problematic area is district heating. The current measuring system 
is too old, and does not provide an incentive to consume less. The improvements in 
this area will mainly be changing the metering system and modernising heat 
generators. 
If the above investments would not take place now, they would be even 
more costly in the future due to the spiralling effects of deterioration. 
 
4.2 Possible financing sources 
When talking about investment financing sources, the first one that financial 
officers usually think of is the “cheapest” one -- the central or regional subsidy. 
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Next is the municipality’s own revenues that are available in the budget (income 
from privatisation), then subsidised loans, and finally, market loans. The 
involvement of the public sector as partners in financing is also more frequent. 
4.2.1 State grants 
The different types of investment grants are the targeted grants, the targeted 
decentralized grants, and the grants for regional equalisation, the ones that we dealt 
with in detail in chapter IV. The purpose of these grants is to enhance municipal 
investment activity and direct investment money into the areas preferred by the 
government. In the last ten years, central subsidies covered approximately 50% of 
municipal investment expenditures. 
4.2.2 Revenues from privatisation 
The other 50% of municipal investments were covered by the income from 
privatisation. Its importance as a financial source has considerably decreased, as 
municipalities do not have many more sellable goods. 
Since 1990, much research dealt with the topic of privatisation of municipal 
companies. The importance of the topic is shown by the changes that have taken 
place in many countries, making empirical research possible. The interesting fact 
about this empirical research is that it contradicts the theories of the 1980’s, and 
found that if a municipal company was sold, it was not the fact of privatisation that 
made it more efficient, but rather it was the new competitive environment that 
applied to all service providers (Millward, [1982], Wortzel – Wortzel, [1989]). 
According to Claessens and Djankov [1998], however, the picture is even 
more complicated. If privatisation, deregulation and stabilisation all take place at 
 50  
the same time, it will increase efficiency, as politicians’ power over soft loans 
decreases. But in the absence of stabilisation, corruption remains, making these 
companies less efficient than they were before privatisation, as in the new situation 
reaching the same level of “profit” takes more time and energy (Claessens and 
Djankov, [1998] pp. 7.) 
 
4.3 Subsidies from the European Union 
4.3.1 Pre-Accession Programs  
Pre-accession countries can expect money from the European Union in 
order to bring their infrastructure levels closer to the EU standard. A priority area 
of grants is the area of environmental investments. In this chapter we deal with the 
EU funds and their criteria. 
The EU promotes accession by giving loans and grants. The main channel 
for the loans is the European Investment Bank (EIB), and the main channel of 
grants is the PHARE program, to which in 2000 two new programs were added, 
the SAPARD (Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural 
Development) and ISPA (L’Instrument Structurel de Pre-Adhésion) programs.  
The regulation of the grant system of the European Union is very 
complicated. The projects at least partially financed from EU funds must be 
sustainable and cover a region. They usually involve the co-operation of several 
partner local governments, sometimes the whole country. 
Another important criterion is that they have to comply with the EU rules, 
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must involve co-financing from other sources, and the partners must be chosen 
through a public procurement process. The accounting of the project must be done 
according to the accounting standards of the Union, and interim reports should be 
prepared several times during the realisation of the project. The applicant must 
communicate in one of the official languages of the EU.  
Between 2000 and 2006 approximately 1 billion ECU will be spent on the 
development of the environmental infrastructure and transport system of the 
accession countries (EBRD [1999]). 
Currently the PHARE programme is the main channel for EU grants. 
Originally, the EU planned to distribute 4,2 billion ECU during the period 1990-
1999, but the amount between 1995-1999 only surpassed 6,7 billion ECU.  
The kinds of projects financed from PHARE grants change according to the 
progress in eligible countries. While at the beginning of the PHARE programme’s 
operation the development of the legal system was the top priority, later 
infrastructure development, especially involving more than one country, took over 
the top place. Accordingly, the main areas of subsidy today are projects related to 
the environment, transport and job creation. 
The ISPA programme is planned to last between 2000 – 2006. Its main 
target is to raise the level of infrastructure of transport and the environment. Its 
budget for the period is 1.04 billion euros, 7-10% of which is earmarked for 
development in Hungary (Romania and Poland have the highest shares). 
The amount that will be available for a particular country is based on the 
population, the per capita GDP, the surface area and the relative environmental 
infrastructure development of the country. 
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The purpose of SAPARD is to finance the development of rural areas in the 
accession countries, and to develop markets for agricultural products, and to create 
job opportunities. The program started in 2000, and will end in 2006. During this 
time the amount of grants will be 520 million euros; Hungary can expect 6-10% of 
this amount. 
The amounts of grants are calculated based on the population working in 
the agricultural sector, the area of agricultural land and the per capita GDP of the 
country.  
 
The other main channel of EU grants and loans is the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The EBRD was founded in 1991 for the 
purpose of improving the economic development of Central and Eastern European 
countries. The European Community is among its shareholders. It takes part in 
technical assistance programs, where besides co-financing the project, know-how 
transfer also plays an important role. Most of EBRD funding is spent on project 
preparation (34%) and realisation (38%) while the rest is spent on consulting (21%) 
and training activities (4%), and financing sectoral studies (1%). 
 
Table 4. Total EBRD grant and investment commitments to PHARE14 and TACIS 
countries, by sectors. 
Sector European 
Commission  
(million euros) 
Other 
resources 
(million euros
As a percentage 
of the total 
Technical 
Assistance 
programs 
(%) 
As a 
percentage of 
the EBRD’s 
investments 
(%) 
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CEALs, CLs and 
RVFs 
62,7 76,0 27,0 1,3 
Community/Social 
Services  
19,4 24,0 8,4 1,7 
Finance and 
Business 
58,1 109,8 32,6 27,6 
Energy 14,9 29,9 8,7 13,6 
Manufacturing/Cons
truction 
23 19,0 8,2 15,6 
Transport and 
Storage 
21,7 25,3 9,1 20,4 
Extractive Industries 2,9 6,4 1,8 5,2 
Telecommunications 4,5 11,1 3,0 9,1 
Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fishing 
1,1 2,6 0,7 2,3 
Commerce and 
Tourism 
0,7 1,1 0,4 3,2 
Grand Total 209,0 305,1 100,0 100,0 
Source: the European Commission and the EBRD [1999]: An evaluation of PHARE and 
TACIS Co-Financing Programmes with the EBRD. pp 32. 
4.3.2 Development sources after accession 
After accession the Structural and Cohesion Funds will take part in 
financing the infrastructural development of the new members. These funds were 
created with the aim of diminishing the regional, social and economical 
backwardness of areas in less developed countries. 
The Structural Funds take part in financing activities to support the 
following objectives: 
1. Development and structural changes in underdeveloped regions;  
2. Social and economic changes in regions with structural problems; 
3. Policies for modernising education and employment. 
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Those regions that are not underdeveloped can nevertheless get financial 
support under the third objective above. (The Council’s 1999. 21. June 
1260/1999/EC decree on the Structural Funds.) 
Table 5 summarises the available amount of the Structural Funds for 2000 - 
2006. 
Table 5. The resources of the Structural Funds for the period between 2000-2006. 
Million EUROs, in 1999. prices 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
29 430 28 840 28 250 27 670 27 080 27 080 26 660 
Source: Appendix to The Council’s 1999. 21. June 1260/1999/EC decree on the Structural 
Funds  
 
The Structural Funds consist of four funds: the European Regional 
Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the European Agricultural 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund, and the Fisheries Fund. These four funds are for 
financing big infrastructural development projects. 
The funds are spent on National and Particular Programs (90% of the funds) 
Common Initiatives (9%), Technical Assistance programs and pilot projects (1%).  
The main goal of the National Program is to develop regions with a per 
capita GDP less than 75% of the Union’s average. All of Hungary would fall into 
this category after the accession. 
The Cohesion Fund helps member states reach the convergence criteria.15 
This fund takes part in financing country-sized projects, and it is shared among 
environmental projects (50%) and projects on transport (50%), so a considerable 
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part of its sources are for infrastructure investments. 
The Cohesion Fund finances programs in countries with a per capita GDP 
less than 90% of the Union average. In 2000, the balance of the Cohesion Fund for 
the period of 2000 - 2006 was 16 billion EUROs. Table 6 illustrates how this 
amount is spread over the years. 
Table 6. The resources of the Cohesion Funds for the period between 2000-2006.  
billion EUROs, in 1999. prices 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
2.615 2.615 2.615 2.615 2.515 2.515 2.510 
Source: Appendix to The Council’s 1999. 21. June 1260/1999/EC decree on the Structural 
Funds 
Over the next six years the purposes of programs under the Cohesion Fund 
are creating job opportunities, improving working conditions in the European 
Union and the development of rural areas. 
To apply for these grants, municipalities have to prepare very detailed 
applications in one of the EU languages. Most of the Hungarian municipalities are 
not able to do that, and it remains one of the big challenges related to accession for 
them.  
Another “problem” that Hungarian municipalities are facing is that the 
international grants are matching grants. In the case of bigger investments, 
municipalities are not able to collect the “matching part” of the grant, in the case of 
smaller investments, the fixed costs of application writing are so high that smaller 
municipalities are not able to pre-finance. 
A very important problem to be solved is how to help municipalities to 
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gather the matching financial resources for the grants, and how to enable 
municipalities to pre-finance feasibility studies, which, in case of a non-successful 
application, is lost, so bank loans are not available for that purpose.  
 
4.4 Cooperation of the public and private sectors 
As we saw, with accession, important European and other international 
funds will be available for Hungarian municipalities. These will be matching 
grants, which means that the municipalities have to be able to mobilise other 
sources too, which, contrary to the past, cannot be state subsidies or privatisation 
revenue. 
The solution seems to be the involvement of the private sector into the 
financing of municipal projects, and an increasing municipal loan raising activity, 
which are also consequences of the decentralisation efforts of the central 
government. 
We can easily find reasons to involve the private sector into public services. 
These reasons include (i) insufficient resources at the municipal level, (ii) better 
efficiency of service delivery, (iii) positive attitude towards technology innovations 
and (iv) stricter financial discipline. 
It is generally true that the sooner a project will yield a profit and the easier  
it is to collect fees for a service, the more probable it is that the private sector will 
want to be a partner in it. 
In the following I summarise the main forms of co-operation between the 
municipal and the private sectors in service provision, including a short description 
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of the “pure municipal service”. I illustrate what role the private sector can take in 
these forms of cooperation. Of course, the whole range of the forms of cooperation 
cannot be shown, as they will vary according to the needs of the partners.  
4.4.1 “Pure municipal service”  
In this case, the service is provided directly by an office or institution of the 
municipality, and it is directly financed from the municipal budget. Typical 
examples for this kind of service provision are tasks that are possible to be 
completed by the unemployed16 in the municipality, such as cleaning the public 
parks.  
One advantage of this service provision form is that the supervising cost is 
low and the sanctions for failing to do the work are based on the internal rules of 
the municipality and not on the civil law. As most services require the involvement 
of municipal assets, it is easier to check their use too. 
The disadvantage of pure municipal service is that the incentives for doing 
the work are not as efficient as they are in the public sector, where the service must 
be continuously adjusted to the requirement of the clients. The solution for this 
problem could be a well-developed incentive system, which makes it possible to 
compare the results with the public sector and with other municipalities. 
4.4.2 Municipal enterprise 
The municipality might create an institution that is independent from the 
municipal budget and normally receives the right of service provision based on 
open tender.  
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The advantage of this form compared to the previous one is that because of 
competition, the municipal company must be flexible to meet the clients’ needs. 
Another advantage is that the municipality, just by preparing obligatory 
documentation concerning companies, has a clearer view of the company’s 
performance than it would otherwise have. The advantage of municipal companies 
compared to private companies is that the supervision of the service provision is 
much simpler than in the case of contracted services. A special problem is that 
partnership is often restricted in these companies, which makes it difficult to 
involve professional investors into the service provision. Furthermore, such 
companies are often favoured in open tenders, which leads to the worsening of 
their performance indicators. 
4.4.3 Contracting out services 
This practice can be used when fully privatising the service provision is not 
politically or strategically feasible, or it would not be permitted under law, or 
public opinion would not accept it. In this case the private sector can be involved in 
the provision of part of the service, such as the fee collection, or cleaning the water 
or sewage pipes. 
It is very important that the interests of the municipality and those of the 
private partner are the same and that the remuneration depends on the completion 
of the task regardless of how it is achieved (in which case the provider will look for 
the most efficient way of providing the service). 
This kind of co-operation is also used when the municipality does not have 
enough experience in contracting out, and it would like to try how it works.  
This form of co-operation in provision of services can become transformed 
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into a financial co-operation (investment) if the contracted company buys part of 
the assets related to the service provision. If it does not have the necessary 
resources to do so, or does not want to invest in the service, it can find financial 
investors. 
4.4.4 Management contracts  
In this case the whole service is contracted out to the private sector. This 
form of co-operation does not include the financial contribution of the private 
sector, but could be the first step towards construction where the private sector is a 
financial investor too. 
4.4.5 Concession contracts 
The concession is a form of co-operation where the service is provided by 
the private sector, which bears the costs of the original investment plus 
maintenance throughout a certain period of time, but the municipality remains the 
owner of the assets.  
As it must be ensured that the profits of the private company cannot be 
increased unreasonably, the concession criteria should include a requirement of “ 
equal level of service with the smallest service fee”. 
4.4.6 Private-public partnerships 
One possibility to mobilise private resources for public investment where 
the public sector often lacks the resources for investments and even for operation is 
to sell ownership interests to the private sector. The municipality can still keep a 
majority of the shares without harming the interests of the private owners. 
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Co-ownership is more easily accepted by the public and local politicians.  
In private-public partnerships a special problem arises from the conflicting 
interests of the municipality. As the owner of the company, it would like to raise its 
income through raising fees, but as a regulating authority, its interest is to keep fees 
low for the public. 
 
In each of the cases above, the responsibility of providing the service 
remains in the hands of the local government, so the public authority has to be 
ready to change the form of the service if the private partner fails to provide 
adequate services. Before providing a service, the municipality must build the 
physical infrastructure for it. The public sector can have different roles in this 
process, either as an investor or just the operator of the investment. The operator 
does not finance the investment, it is only responsible for the organization of the 
work, choosing the sub-contractors and ensuring that the work is done. There might 
be occasions when the operator has to finance cash flow, so it should have a sound 
financial base. 
In the Hungarian practice, there are three types of “loans” offered by the 
operator of the investment: (i) the real loan, (ii) the fictional contract for selling an 
asset, and (iii) late payment for the services it offers to the municipality. 
If we examine these “loans”, we notice that the costs associated with them 
are often much higher then it would be in the case of a normal bank loan. 
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4.4.7 Impediments against co-operation between the public and private 
sectors 
The previously described forms of co-operation sometimes do not work. 
The reasons are as follows: 
• Many municipalities made contracts in Hungary that were not favourable 
for them. These contracts influenced public opinion in a negative way.  
• Municipalities are afraid that if they contract services out, they lose 
control over employment, and the subsequent increase in the number of 
unemployed would have a negative impact on the municipal budget. 
• Another concern of local governments is that after “giving the service 
away”, they will not be able to influence the service fees despite their 
legal powers as the pricing authority. At the same time, the municipality-
set fees are often so low that the private sector loses interest in co-
operating with municipalities. 
• Municipalities are often not familiar with the interests of the private 
sector. 
• The municipality has to be ready to take over the service provision if the 
private provider fails.  
• Municipalities are afraid that in some situations the private provider 
becomes dominant. 
 
The remedy for these problems is to make good contracts. The municipality 
could involve contracted experts into the process. 
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An efficient tool would be collecting model contracts and making them 
available for the municipalities. (Baar, [2000] pp. 10.). 
Fortunately, Hungarian municipalities agree that contracts should be 
available to the public. Through access to contracts, citizens may have more trust in 
new service providers and may not automatically think of future job losses and 
price increases. 
Another practice to be followed is to introduce competition for limited 
concession contracts in place of a free market. In this case, the service provider will 
have an incentive to perform well because the following year it might lose the right 
to provide the service. The same result could be reached if the municipality does 
not privatise the whole service but keeps a part of it under its own supervision, e. g. 
privatising garbage collection and treatment, but keeping the garbage treatment 
plant itself under municipal supervision. 
4.4.8 The phases of investments 
Three phases of the realisation of an investment can be identified. The first 
phase is the planning phase, when the elaboration of the different studies, e. g. 
feasibility and financial studies and technical plans, takes place. The municipality 
finds the investors, sub-contractors and other partners for the project. These roles 
can be played by one or several actors. Typical for this phase is a sudden increase 
of costs, which is a consequence of buying materials, hiring workers and 
elaborating the above mentioned plans. Due to the lack of financial reserves, 
municipalities can rarely pre-finance these costs, so they have to consider whom to 
involve into the investment as a financial partner. According to municipal 
calculations, the costs of elaborating a feasibility study can add up to 5% of the 
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total investment. If the project will not be realised, this expense is lost. It is 
understandable, therefore, that banks will not lend money for this purpose, while at 
the same time state subsidies are also difficult to acquire for pre-financing 
purposes. 
If a municipality applies for investment grants, it has to demonstrate that it 
owns the required part of the investment. This has major importance in decisions 
on state grants, as well as on bank loans.  
The second phase, when the project is realised, has many risks. This can be 
due to unexpected increases in the price of materials, inflation, introduction of new 
technology, or cash-flow problems. Another problem is that municipalities usually 
do not prepare emergency scenarios for such cases, although it would save the 
project from long delays. The repayment of loans and interest also starts in the 
second phase of the project.  
The third phase, when the assets already operate, is often not considered 
to be part of the investment process, although it is only in this phase when 
questions from the previous phases, such as whether the fees will cover the loans 
and current expenditures, can be answered. (Nevitt – Fabozzi [1997]. pp. 19-39.) 
 
 The following chapter deals with loan financing, because some municipal 
infrastructure investments in the long term generate revenue directly through 
service fees (such as water and sewage investments) while others contribute to 
local development (such as road investments). As a consequence, infrastructure 
investments should be financed from loans (Bird - Tassonyi [2001]). 
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5 INVESTMENT FINANCING FROM THE CREDIT MARKET 
5.1 The dilemma of financing from loans or a municipality’s own sources 
When a municipality starts an investment, it has to face the question 
whether to borrow or to finance from the currently available sources in the budget 
17. 
The arguments pro and cont becoming indebted have been on the “menu” 
for years, as municipalities following a conservative fiscal policy try not to get 
indebted, but there are situations where raising loans proves to be a good 
investment. 
If a municipality uses some resources for a specific purpose, it loses the 
opportunity of using them in other projects. This represents lost profit, which the 
municipality would have gained if it had invested in something else.  
Of course, the amount of opportunity cost depends on the development of 
the country, the opportunities of the municipal sector and the growth rate in the 
country.  
5.1.1 Arguments for loan financing 
In general, in growing economies, loan financing proves to be a better 
option (Petersen [1999.]). The reasons are as follows: 
• Current revenues are insufficient and too inflexible to fund "lumpy" cash 
needs on a pay-as-you-go basis. Projects need pre-financing from the 
beginning, when it does not yield any revenues.  
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• Future inflation reduces the cost of borrowing. Debt can be repaid with 
currency that is worth less than the value of that borrowed.  
• The investments financed from loans are revenue generating, and based on 
economic reasons, it is better to divide the expenses during the life of the 
asset, and not to put such a burden on the municipality at the time of 
purchasing. This is also considered to be a “fair” division of expenses 
among the users of the asset.18 Payment of costs for use of capital can be 
synchronised with the flow of benefits over the useful life of the asset being 
financed.  
• These investments are usually needed for sustaining growth. Without them 
growth would slow down. 
5.1.2 Arguments against loan financing 
Of course, the conservative approach, “pay as you go” financing, also has 
its own advantages. Some of these are: 
• No interest expense is incurred. Money not spent on interest costs can be 
used to fund additional projects. Municipalities raising loans spend the 
money of future generations, and decrease the municipality’s freedom of 
decision. 
• Debt capacity is reserved for other, possibly more important future projects.  
• Future users/taxpayers are not responsible for paying for projects approved 
by today’s government.  
• The use of credit is too tempting and will lead to over-commitment of 
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future resources.  
 
Of course, one can only decide about the financial construction of an investment 
if all political and economic circumstances are taken into account. Calculations 
of rate of return, preparing feasibility studies and many discussions among 
stakeholders in the project must precede the decision. . 
As can be seen, both options have advantages and disadvantages, but in 
growing economies such as Hungary loan financing seems to be more attractive 
(Petersen, [1999]). The reasons are:  
i) These investments are usually needed for sustaining growth. 
Without them growth would slow down. In order to operate the 
assets, financing must be secured in advance, which is only possible 
through banks and other investors. If these investments are deferred, 
then even greater investments will be required in order to 
accomplish the same results (spiral effect). Investments financed 
from loans are revenue generating, and based on economic reasons, 
it is better to spread the expenses over the life of the asset, and not to 
put such a burden on the municipality at the time of purchasing. This 
is also considered to be a “fair” division of expenses among the 
users of the asset. 
ii) Loan financing is the best tool for harmonising the payment of costs 
with the flow of benefits.  
iii) Finally, Hungarian municipalities do not have sufficient resources 
for financing such investments from current revenues. 
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5.2 Municipalities and the credit market 
The credit market satisfies only those needs where the repayment of equity 
and interest seems to be secure. A private borrower is creditworthy if it has a stable 
income, and has a prudent spending behaviour. It is similar in the case of 
municipalities. 
5.2.1 The prerequisites of municipal creditworthiness at the local level 
Local governments are considered creditworthy when they meet the 
following requirements: 
 
1.) a stable revenue 
2.) good management skills and an efficient decision making system 
3.) local politicians who are able to make decisions 
4.) local citizens who are creditworthy as well, and are supporting their 
politicians 
5.) good cash-management, an efficient tax-collection system, and effective 
actions against non-payers 
6.) trust of the lenders (public opinion) in the specific municipality. 
 
In the following, we give a short description about the performance of 
Hungarian municipalities with respect to the above factors. 
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5.2.1.1 Income sources of the municipalities 
The most important requirement for local creditworthiness is the existence 
of a stable income, the amount of which depends on the municipality, and not on 
the will of the central government or economic cycles.  When considering 
creditworthiness the following must be taken into account. 
A large part of the income from municipalities’ own sources comes from 
privatisation, which is not sustainable. The other local source of income could be 
the tax income of the municipality, the proportion in the budget of which varies a 
lot according to the size of the companies in the settlement.  
According to the regulations of 1999, when a municipality applies for a 
central grant, the matching part from its own resources could be either (i) 
municipal property, (ii) an approved bank loan, (iii) another approved grant, or (iv) 
fees and charges on residents. The law states that other state budget resources, 
regional development resources and donations from abroad cannot be considered as 
the municipality’s own part of a matching grant. 
5.2.1.2 Management 
The due diligence of local managers should result in their ability to; (i) 
respond to changes in local market conditions, (ii) recognise problems, (iii) 
implement alternative solutions to solving problems, (iv) evaluate and compare 
solutions, and (v) make long-term forecasts. The long-term forecast is crucial in the 
context of creditworthiness to demonstrate a municipality’s ability to pay over the 
period of the plan and to maintain or increase its creditworthiness. This is of course 
possible only if the municipality has a long-term strategy and is able to foresee and 
influence its income. 
 69  
Furthermore, if a bank finances a municipal project, it must thoroughly 
analyse the feasibility of the project, its liquidation value and the political stability 
of local management.  The situation in Hungary in this respect is very good, 
because the local government sector as a whole operates with surpluses, which 
means that most of them are following a rather conservative fiscal policy. 
 
5.2.1.3 Local politics 
Local politicians must often make unpopular decisions (introduction of new 
taxes, increase of the old taxes), which they must be able to explain. The 
explanation of why changes are necessary and inevitable could be based on 
theories of public policy -- e. g. where local taxes are higher, the municipality is 
able to spend more on public services, increasing the net benefit to the taxpayer. 
 
5.2.1.4 Creditworthiness of citizens 
In the literature published in Hungary on this subject, this is a question that 
has not been adequately dealt with. No matter how brilliant the local government 
policy may be, if the citizens or local companies are not able to pay the taxes and 
user fees, the municipality will not be creditworthy.  
5.2.1.5 Trust in the municipality 
Based on experience, if the market does not trust the municipality, a bond 
issue becomes practically illiquid. The good news is when there is no news. 
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5.2.2 The prerequisites of municipal creditworthiness at the national level 
The state is responsible for the creditworthiness of the local level, so it has 
to fulfil the requirements that have great importance when rating municipalities.  
5.2.2.1 Political stability 
In countries in transition, the stability of the political system and legal 
background mean that governments are following the same policies 
concerning participation in international markets, willingness to become 
EU member states, and maintaining legislation regulating government 
finance and management even through changes in government. If the 
political system were not stable, it would reduce municipal 
creditworthiness considerably. Of course, it is also in the interest of the 
state to be creditworthy itself. 
5.2.2.2 Legal stability, property rights 
Laws regulating municipal management and finance must be in 
accordance with each other, and property rights must be clear. The total 
available amount of central transfers should be predictable, and the 
factors affecting changes in such amount should be laid down in law. 
- Accounting and audit  
The question of auditing and accounting has high relevance to this 
subject. The comparability of municipal performance is ensured if the 
accounting system within the country is comparable and the local 
governments are audited countrywide.  
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- Low inflation rate 
If the inflation rate is low (this can be achieved by a strict fiscal policy), 
interests on loans will be predictable, making long term planning and 
long term lending possible. (Barabás – Hamecz – Neményi [1998]. pp 
798.). 
- The state itself is creditworthy 
According to a general rule the rating of a municipality cannot be higher 
than that of the state itself. The reason is that the municipal system is a 
sub-system of the state, and in countries in transition, a high proportion 
of the local budget comes in the form of subsidies from the central 
budget. 
According to the factors above, the central government has two main tasks 
related to the creditworthiness of municipalities. First, it has to keep its own 
creditworthiness as high as possible in order to maintain the creditworthiness of the 
municipalities and secondly, it has to create the institutional and legal background 
for municipal credit market participation. 
5.3 The regulation of municipal credit market participation  
A very important question is to what extent the state intervenes in the 
relationship between the municipalities and the loan market. 
In certain states there is no special limitation on sub-national borrowing; the 
only limits on issuing bonds and raising loans come from the fiscal conservatism of 
citizens and representatives.19  
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Ter-Minassian (1996) set forth four requirements that must be met by 
financial markets, relying on market discipline in facilitating effective and 
independent sub-national borrowing activity: 
(i.) The markets should be free and open and the intermediaries should 
not place local governments in a privileged position in the market. 
(ii.) Information about the borrower’s debt and repayment capacity 
should be accessible. 
(iii.) The borrower should be forced to act responsibly in the marketplace. 
(iv.) The central government should not guarantee sub-national 
borrowings. (This would mean that the taxpayers of the whole country would have 
to bear the costs of borrowing of a particular borrower.) 
 
According to Bird and Tassonyi (2001), if two of the above criteria are met, 
it is enough to allow municipalities to act on their own in the marketplace. These 
two criteria concern (i) freedom of information and (ii) the responsible behaviour 
of borrowers on the market. 
Even in countries where municipalities are free to participate in credit 
market transactions, the central government might set limits for municipal 
borrowing. This is needed because the market often assumes the existence of 
central guarantees of local debt, even where not explicit, which might seriously 
undermine the creditworthiness of the state. Other reasons for central intervention 
are: (i) local borrowing raises the cost of capital for the private sector; (ii) the state 
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might compete for the same resources as the municipalities; and (iii) it worsens the 
balance of the central budget. 
 
On the other hand, to some extent the state might support municipal 
borrowing. The reasons are: 
(i) Local borrowing decreases the financial burden on the central 
budget.  
(ii) Loans are usually more efficient than grants (the efficiency of 
capital increases). 
(iii) Municipalities realise improvements from loans that are closer to the 
needs of citizens as compared to grants.  
(iv) The repayment of the debt can last the whole lifetime of the realised 
asset. 
(v) Local borrowing provides a good investment opportunity for the 
local financial market, pension funds and insurance funds.  
Among the levers of control of the central level one can identify (i) passive 
tools (when the limits laid down in different laws prohibit over-spending) and (ii) 
active tools (when the higher levels of government prescribe an approval process 
before borrowing). 
Active tools are used when: 
i.)  Each loan must be approved by a higher authority (in the case of Hungary 
this would be the Ministry, the central government). 
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ii.) The amount and rates of the loans must be approved as well 
iii.) The loans must be approved by referendum 
iv.) The whole of project must be approved 
The main forms of passive control are 
i.)  The so-called „golden rule”, under which municipalities cannot finance 
their operating costs from loans. 
ii.) Setting a certain limit on the annual debt, e. g. the amount of loans 
compared to the municipality’s own revenues, or a certain proportion of 
the municipality’s budget. 
In Hungary the central government uses passive control to limit municipal debt. 
 
5.4 The Hungarian municipal credit market 
Hungarian laws about municipal borrowing leave a great deal of freedom to 
municipalities, but as Figure 4 illustrates, they do not take advantage of this 
opportunity. 
The limit on municipal borrowing is 70% of the municipality’s own 
adjusted current income, which means that a municipality cannot have loans in an 
amount more than 70% of the difference between its short term income and short 
term obligations (in a given year). 
The following figure compares actual municipal borrowing to the limit on 
municipal borrowing.  
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Figure 4. Municipal borrowing and the municipality’s own adjusted current income 
20 
Source: Ministry of Interior, Department of Municipal Finance, 2000. 
 
The answer to the question “Why municipalities do not use their borrowing 
opportunities?” is very simple. 
One reason is that other municipal revenues such as central grants and 
income from privatisation proved to be enough in the last ten years and the fiscal 
behaviour of the typical municipal financial officer could be characterised by 
conservatism. (Barati [1999]). The other reason is that in case there is no state 
guarantee on municipal debt, then there is a strong market control on borrowing. In 
Hungary, the state does not repay municipal debt, so municipalities can raise loans 
if they meet the criteria set by the lender. 
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5.5 Tools for enhancing municipal credit market participation 
5.5.1 State guarantees 
The simplest form of enhancing municipal credit market participation is to 
offer state guarantees on municipal loans. 
A state guarantee occurs when the state, instead of subsidising an 
investment directly, guarantees the loans raised for the investment. These 
guarantees can be direct, as in the practice in most Central and Eastern European 
countries, but in most cases they are indirect, i. e. the project for which the loan is 
needed must be approved by a state agency in order for the municipality to be able 
to raise the loan.  
In the case of indirect guarantees, lenders assume that the state, after 
approving a project and the raising of the loan, also guarantees the necessary loans. 
This involves the risk of “moral hazard”, meaning the situation where 
municipalities, because they can easily get access to loans, will borrow much over 
the limits, and the state will be responsible for repayment. If this happens, it has a 
negative effect on future borrowing conditions, as lenders in such circumstances 
will ask for even greater insurance (Darche [1997]). 
The most common form of direct guarantee is the guarantee of loan 
repayment, but guarantees can take other forms too, such as guaranteeing the 
exchange rate or a certain level of income. 
Another tool for enhancing municipal loan raising activity is the 
establishment of special banks, financial institutions that represent the borrowing 
needs of more that one municipality, therefore decreasing the costs of borrowing. 
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Various funds that subsidise infrastructure development, and credit rating agencies 
that rate municipalities and municipal projects are also institutions with the purpose 
of helping municipalities in their credit raising activities. 
In the following section I briefly introduce these institutions.  
5.5.2 Special banks 
Special banks are banks that collect private savings and lend this money to 
local governments. They are more traditional in Europe, where the savings of 
citizens was kept in the local savings banks that collected the citizens’ money in 
order to finance local investments from it. A typical example is the German 
practice where one owner of the local bank is the municipality, which takes out 
long-term loans from it. Other examples of special banks are the Credit Communal 
de Belgique, the Credit Communal de France (DEXIA) and the Dutch Municipal 
Bank, which today have an increasing international role in municipal financing. 
5.5.3 Bond banks 
The Municipal bond bank (MBB) is an institution that issues bonds in its 
own name, and then relends the money to municipalities (buys municipal bonds). 
The main advantage of the MBB’s approach is that it increases economies of scales 
in issuing bonds and reduces the risk premium by pooling the risks, making bond 
issuance an affordable business even for small municipalities. 
A further advantage is that its professional staff possesses the knowledge 
required for bond financing, so an individual municipality does not have to hire 
expensive bond specialists.  Moreover, the prices of several of its services, such as 
consultation, normally rather expensive, are considerably reduced or free for 
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investors. Other services an MBB may offer are as follows: 
- Guaranteeing an interest rate -- in this case the state guarantees the 
interest payment on the loans, but not the repayment of capital; 
- management of a state guarantee fund (this does not include 
replenishment of the fund or the repayment of loans); 
- offering total guarantees 
- in case of bankrupt municipalities, assessment, management of the 
bankruptcy process, and assistance to the municipality (Peterson 
[2000]). 
5.5.4 State Revolving Fund 
The State Revolving Fund is a special form of MBB. This fund is extra 
budgetary, and the management of the money is regulated according to special 
laws. The fund offers low interest loans to local governments, and then re-lends the 
incoming interest payments to other local governments, making the fund 
“revolving” (Peterson, [1996]). The purposes for which State Revolving Funds are 
created can be varied.  Examples include the Sewage State Revolving Fund, 
Drinking Water State Revolving Fund, etc. 
Although the most typical examples of State Revolving Funds are US Funds 
that offer loans with an interest rate 2-4% lower than market rates, they can also be 
found among the transition countries. In Poland and the Czech Republic, the 
Environmental Bank and the Environmental Funds are such funds. 
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5.5.4.1 State Revolving Fund Revenue bonds 
State Revolving Funds issue revenue bonds that are exempt from federal 
taxes. These bonds are backed by the income deriving from the repayment by 
municipalities of local revenue bonds or general obligation bonds, and a reserve 
fund. 
The advantage of this construction is that the State Revolving Fund is able 
to raise funds at a reasonable price because it has a high credit rating, which it can 
re-lend to municipalities under more favourable conditions than the credit market 
can offer. The margin covers the expenses of the Fund. 
5.5.4.2 State Revolving Fund Interest subsidy 
The most common form of subsidy given by Sewage and Water State 
Revolving Funds is the interest subsidy.  
The fund, because it is subsidised by the state, is able to offer loans below 
market rates, sometimes at even zero percent.  But a disadvantage is that, without 
interest income, the capital of the fund constantly decreases, so it requires 
continuous state support.  
5.5.5 Municipal Development Funds 
MDFs work basically the same way as the Special Municipal Banks.  
Among its shareholders we find municipalities and sometimes bodies at other 
levels of government, so besides loans, it is also a channel for various forms of 
government subsidies. Instead of giving loans directly to the municipal sector, 
MDFs sometimes give loans to banks with municipal clients in order to enhance 
the municipal credit market from the “supply” side. Their main objective is to 
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“push” banks into a situation when their interest is to develop loan products for 
municipalities, and therefore to indirectly promote co-operation between banks and 
municipalities. 
The “mission” of MDFs is more complicated than that of the special banks. 
It involves improving the efficiency of local investments. According to their 
mission, among their lending activities they offer services such as elaborating 
business and technical plans and assistance in seeking additional funds for the 
investment. 
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6 TYPES OF MUNICIPAL LOANS - THE MUNICIPAL DEBT 
Municipal debt means the financial obligation of the municipality itself, or 
of a specific municipal project. It is almost impossible to sort out all debt types -- 
they can be differentiated according to their terms, their backing, their currencies, 
their term, or the identity of the lender or the borrower. 
 
The main characteristics of current borrowing practices are as follows 
(Amborski, [1998] pp. 15.): 
- a municipality can raise loans if it has the ability to repay it, 
- cumulative debt burden may not be excessive21, 
- the term for loan repayment should not exceed the economic life of the 
asset. 
 
6.1 The Different Debt Types Classified According to Their Backing 
In order to project the future trends in the development of the Hungarian 
municipal credit market, I introduce some loan constructions that are widespread in 
the countries with highly developed credit markets.  
6.1.1 General Obligation Bonds (GO Bonds) 
GO bonds are issued by municipalities. The backing of this type of bond 
 82  
consists of general revenues of the municipality, e. g. local taxes, service fees, state 
subsidies, and the tax- and fee-raising potential of the municipality, although it may 
be difficult to raise future revenues. Of course, issuing revenue bonds is only 
possible if the municipality has income, and/or central revenues are predictable. 
In developed countries there are special districts that can issue general 
obligation bonds because they have a basis for backing these loans through their 
tax levying authority 22. Investments that serve the needs of more than one 
municipality, .i .e. of a district, are financed from taxes levied by the district. 
As municipal associations cannot levy taxes in Hungary, the backing of 
such a loan could consist of a dedicated revenue stream or other income of the 
partner municipalities.  
In some countries, if the borrower is not able to meet its obligations, the 
lender may force it to raise the level of taxes. This is of course only possible in 
countries where the maximum level of municipal taxes is not limited by law. In 
such cases, the concept of GO bonds can be used in only a limited way, or its use 
requires other guarantees (Peterson [1998] pp 20.). 
 
Special Purpose District 
…Special Purpose Districts are political subdivisions created to provide economic 
development or related services to residential, commercial or industrial areas. These can be 
both within an incorporated municipality or outside its limits, in "developing areas". These 
districts can represent viable arrangements for effective delivery of public utility services 
such as water, sewers, hospitals, fire protection and roads, when demand overflows the 
administrative boundaries of individual local governments. Special district obligations are 
generally tax-backed although the ability of special districts to raise taxes may often be 
restricted, by tax ceilings for instance. "Tax Increment Districts" can be established for 
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local governments to levy taxes on the growth of property value, and these have been used 
to fund the re-development of neglected downtown areas. They have been viewed as viable 
and safe instruments when a project area is of a significant size and represents a diverse 
taxpayer base. Some special districts may be speculative in nature. (El Daher, [1997]) 
pp. 5.) 
 
6.1.2 Dedicated Revenue Bonds  
Municipalities undertaking specific municipal projects may issue Revenue 
bonds. In this case the municipality raises funds against specific (named) revenue 
flows. Usually the subject revenue flow is the revenue generated by the service that 
is financed from the loan, but it also could consist of state transfers or subsidies if 
they periodically and foreseeably arrive to the municipality’s account. 
However, this financing method, despite its positive side, has some 
disadvantages as well. 
The positive effects are, for example, that it permits a relationship between the 
service and the fee for it, and if in the past the service was “overpriced” and 
produced extra income, the extra burden on the consumers becomes obvious. 
The disadvantages are supported by economic theories. The limited reliability may 
hinder redistribution of infrastructure and services among population groups (say, 
from rich sections to poor ones) by keeping potentially redistributable revenues for 
the benefit of an already privileged area. The disadvantage concerns the effect on 
prior loans. The expressions "asset stripping" or "security dilution" concern the 
situation when prior lenders have looked to overall revenues as a source of 
repayment, and a subsequent sequestering or stripping away of revenue streams 
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weakens the credit.  
 
6.1.3 Double-barrelled bonds 
Double-barrelled loans are secured both ways. They are a mixture of GO 
bonds and Revenue bonds. A first guaranty consists of specific revenues of the 
municipality or of the project, and if that is insufficient, the second guaranty 
consists of the general revenues of the municipality23. 
 
6.1.4 Project financing 
In this case, the guaranty for the repayment of the loan is the revenue 
generated by the particular project and the assets of the project. The issuer is the 
municipality or its project. A big advantage of this form is that small municipalities 
with lower tax and fee income also can start bigger investments, because the rating 
applies to the project itself instead of the municipality (except where the law 
provides that the debts of a project unable to repay a loan automatically becomes a 
debt of the municipality, as in Canada). 
 
6.2 Financing investments with short term debt 
While long-term debts are normally used to finance investments, short-term 
loans are usually used to finance current expenditures and to solve temporary cash-
flow problems. Short-term municipal debts are debts that expire within one year. 
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Nevertheless, short-term debts can be use other ways too. If municipalities 
issue short-term commercial paper that rolls over for several years, this can be 
considered a long-term debt such as the CP Program. In this case the municipality 
calculates the financing needs of the investment for each year, and borrows a sum 
that covers this need plus the interest payment of the previously raised funds every 
year. 
Of course, a municipality following this practice has to take into account the 
risk of refinancing, that is the risk of not being able to borrow at the same cost 
every year (the cost of borrowing may be higher). This can occur due to changes in 
the macro-economic situation and changes in the credit rating of the municipality.  
An important question is: who are potential lenders to a municipality? 
Financial officers must know potential lenders well in order to create bond 
constructions that fit their municipality’s requirements best and to reach better loan 
conditions.  
The following section summarises the circle of potential municipal lenders.  
6.3 Potential lenders 
6.3.1 Banks 
When one talks about municipal loans, in Hungary one automatically thinks 
of the banks first. The market can be characterised by competition among banks. 
They consider municipalities as possible clients, so they prepare different loan 
constructions satisfying the special needs of the local sector. In international 
practice, one can see various forms of co-operation between municipalities and 
banks. In Hungary, bank loans, which previously have had a limited role in 
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municipal financing, will become more important because:  
1. Municipalities have few resources to pre-finance, plan and realise projects. 
2. The environmental requirements of accession to the European Union and the 
matching feature of grants require municipalities to have their a own revenues. 
3. Central subsidies are no longer available for providing the matching part of EU 
grants. 
4. In 2001, the inflation rate in Hungary was 6,8% (Hungarian National Bank), 
which allows loan financing with fixed interest rates.  
 
Municipal loans are dealt with in detail in Appendix. II.  
 
6.3.2 The private sector 
The role of the private sector as a partner in service provision as well as an 
investor in the public sector was discussed in chapter IV. When a municipality 
chooses a private partner for co-operation, one criterion is the financial strength of 
the investor. The investor has to have enough resources to finance possible cash-
flow problems due to the insufficient flow of revenues at the start of the project.  
6.3.3 Pension, Investment, Social Security and other Funds 
Although these funds do not have a long history in Hungary, it is very likely 
that they will soon become a source of investment in public development. The 
main obstacle until now has been that the Law on Securities made public offerings 
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too complicated and costly compared to closed offerings.24 
6.3.4 Another municipality  
When a municipality has savings, it can invest in another municipality’s 
investment, or it can buy bonds issued by another municipality or by one of its 
projects. 
6.3.5 The citizens 
Citizens are also important players in the scene of local finance. First, they 
can directly buy municipal bonds, and second, through paying service fees, they 
provide the basis for paying back loans raised for municipal infrastructure 
development. 
 
6.4 How to attract investors  
Another important question concerning the Hungarian situation is how 
municipalities and possible investors meet on the marketplace. 
Attracting investors requires thorough preparation. It is part of a 
development strategy that requires elaborate plans and actions.  
• One situation occurs when a municipality looks for an investor on its 
own, independently from any others. A typical Hungarian example for 
this situation is when a municipality finds a company on its territory that 
is also interested in the realisation of the municipal plan, e. g. sewage or 
garbage treatment. The company will be willing to invest in the plan if it 
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is cheaper than building its own plant. In this case, the municipality has to 
be careful in planning the capacity of the plant, because in case the 
company would close down, the plant still has to operate efficiently. 
• Another possibility is if the municipality issues bonds through an 
intermediary. In this case, the intermediary has to find investors for the 
project. The advantage of working with intermediaries is that they know 
the market very well, so that the bond issue might be less risky for the 
municipality 
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7 DATA ANALYSIS 
In the autumn of 1999 (the first phase of research) and 2000 (the second 
phase of research), TARKI continued its series of questionnaires sent to all of the 
mayors in Hungary, except the capital, Budapest25. 
The questionnaire of 1999 addressed plans for 2000, while the questionnaire 
of 2000 addressed plans for 2001.  The fist phase was answered by 747 
municipalities, while the second was answered by 939, which means an answering 
rate of approximately 30%. The data was weighed by the research staff of TARKI 
based on the Central Statistical Office’s data on municipalities. 
The municipalities were grouped based on their income and their 
investment rate.  
The income groups: 
1. Low budget (poor) municipalities are those with a per capita income 
less then 80% of the median.  
2. Medium municipalities are ones with a per capita municipal income 
between 80% and 120% of the median. 
3. Large budget (rich) municipalities are those with a per capita income 
that is higher than 120% of the median.  
 
The groups based on the investment rate: 
1. Operating municipalities are those with an investment rate of less than 
50% of the median26 
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2. Average investors are municipalities with an investment rate between 
50% and 200% of the median. 
3. Investors are municipalities with an investment rate higher than 200% 
of the median. 
 
7.1 Municipal expectations 
Municipalities were asked what they thought about the economy of 
Hungary and that of their local area, and whether they expected the situation to be 
better or worse in the future. TARKI was interested in what municipalities thought 
about their chances of acquiring financial resources, and – due to financial 
difficulties – whether they planned to decrease the number of their institutions. 
The answers given to the questions helped the researchers to understand 
how municipalities see their environment, what kinds of plans they have and what 
steps they intend to take in the future in order to address their situation, and how 
they behave in the credit market. 
As both questionnaires included these questions, it was possible to compare 
the data in both years and to draw conclusions.  
In 2000, municipalities seemed to be more pessimistic based on their 
answers than in 1999. More municipalities (4-5 percentage points) expected that 
getting access to central resources, as well as being successful with loan 
applications, would be more difficult. Accordingly, more municipalities expected 
to raise their level of taxes. The biggest difference between the data of the two 
years concerned the decrease in the number of municipal institutions. While in 
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1999 18% of municipalities expected to close down some of their institutions, in 
2000 this number was 12%.  
Figure 5. Municipal expectations in 2000 as a percentage of all municipalities 
Source: Calculations of the author based on the TARKI municipal database of 2000 
 
The following section examines how these data differ according to the 
different municipal groups. The detailed data can be found in Appendix III. 
Regional data 
Decreasing the number of municipal institutions was more common in 
North-Eastern Hungary and South-Transdanubia compared to the average of the 
whole database. The reason is that these are the regions of poor municipalities (this 
is especially true for Northern-Hungary, where more than 20% of the poor 
municipalities in Hungary are located). 
61 and 67% of municipalities from South-Transdanubia and Northern-
Hungary respectively expected the worsening of their loan conditions, which is 
higher than the average in the sample. 
Municipal opinions in the different regions did not differ about the chances 
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for acquiring central grants. In every region, about 80% of municipalities expected 
that it would become more difficult. 
Thirty five percent of Hungarian municipalities planned to raise their tax 
level, but this amount was surpassed by municipalities from Central Hungary, and 
Central- and Southern- Transdanubia.  
Municipal groups based on investment activity 
Municipalities’ opinions did not differ according to their investment 
activity. Expectations in the categories of operating, average investor and investor 
municipalities were very similar.  
 
Municipal groups based on the size of the budget 
About 20% of poor municipalities expected to reduce the number of their 
institutions, twice the average of the whole sample. 69% of the municipalities of 
the same category expected loan conditions to become more difficult, which is 
higher than in the whole sample, where this rate was 48%. 
Expectations about central grants were very similar in the three groups 
(80% expected them to become more difficult). As compared to 35% of the whole 
sample, 45% of the richest municipalities had plans to raise their tax level. 
7.1.1 Expectations about the situation of the economy 
In 2000, on a scale from 1 to 10 the economic situation of the country 
received a score of 4,99, while the municipalities’ assessment of their own 
economic situation was worse, getting a score of 3,86 on the same scale.  
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The relevant data for the year before respectively were 4,5 and 4,2, which 
means that municipalities became optimistic concerning the changes in the 
country’s economic situation, but did not notice the changes in their own situation. 
This is also reflected in the scores given to the change perceived in their 
lives. The score concerning changes in the country’s economy in 2000 was 5,14 
(the previous year it was 4,8). It is important that municipalities were optimistic 
despite the fact that they expected the acquisition of central resources to become 
more difficult – they started to accept the necessity of alternative financial sources, 
and assessed their own situation in the light of their chances to make use of them. 
Categories based on investment activity and municipal budget 
The investor municipalities were more optimistic concerning the economic 
situation. In both years of the research the score of this group concerning the 
economic situation of the country was above 5,2, and concerning the municipality’s 
economic situation it was above 4. 
The results were similar in the groups based on the budget size. The richest 
municipalities were more optimistic than the poorer ones.  
Municipalities in the different regions 
The opinion of municipalities in Central-Hungary about the national and 
local economic situation, and their expectations on how this situation would 
change, was better than the sample average opinion.  
Municipalities in Central- and Western- Transdanubia, Northern and 
Southern-Great Plain, and in Northern Hungary were more optimistic about the 
national economic situation, but had a pessimistic opinion about their local 
conditions. 
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Municipalities according to their size 
These are the categories where the answers differed most from the sample 
average. The bigger a municipality was, more optimistic it was concerning 
economic expectations.  
 
7.2 Municipal budget data 
Based on the answers the average per capita municipal income in 2000 was 
69,000 HUF. This is less than municipalities planned a year before for the same 
period of time (83,6 thousand HUF). 
In 2001, the income of 26% of municipalities stayed below 80% of the 
median, falling therefore into the category of “poor” municipalities, and the income 
of 36% of municipalities surpassed 120% of the median. The latter are the “rich” 
municipalities. Eighty percent of poor municipalities have a population of fewer 
than 2000 inhabitants. 
A year earlier, 21% of municipalities were poor, while 34% of them were 
rich. The broadening of the two extreme categories means that differences among 
municipalities grew. 
 
The questionnaires contained questions about local current income, the 
normatives, the PIT, the municipality’s own current revenues, and investment 
activity. 
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7.2.1 Current income 
Based on the answers to the questionnaires, the municipalities’ current 
income in 2000 was 33700 HUF per capita. 62,3% of municipalities expected this 
amount to grow, 14,4% that it would decrease and 23,3% of municipalities 
expected that the amount of current income would not change. Those 
municipalities that expected a decrease in the per capita current income were 
mainly from the Western- and Central Transdanubia regions and the “rich” 
municipalities. 
The detailed data can be found in Appendix IV. 
 
The results concerning the change in the amount of normatives and income 
from PIT were very similar to the above. 
The results were similar to the above in the case of revenues from the 
central government, i. e. the PIT income and the normatives. (The detailed data can 
be found in Appendix V.) 
Two thirds of municipalities expected that their PIT income would increase, 
10% expected it to decrease, and 23% did not expect any change. The data in the 
case of the normatives were 78,5%, 7,3% and 14,2% respectively. 
Municipalities expecting the decrease of central subsidies were from the 
group of rich municipalities. 
7.2.2 Revenues from municipal sources 
Among the revenues from a municipality’s own resources, the questionnaire 
in 2000 had detailed questions about property taxes and taxes on tourism. 
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29% of municipalities expected their property tax income to grow, 8% that 
it would decrease, and 63% did not expect any change in the amount. 
Municipalities expecting the growth of property tax were from South and North 
Great Plain, and from the group of rich and investing municipalities.  
34% of municipalities expected that their income from the tax on tourism 
and from the turnover tax would grow (mainly the rich and the average investors), 
19% that it would decrease, and 47% did not expect any change. (The detailed data 
can be found in Appendix VI.) 
 
7.3 The investment practice of municipalities 
The median of investment expenditures as a percentage of the municipal 
budget in 1999 was 5,7% based on the answers, while in 2000, it reached 11,8%.  
The research examined the investment activity of municipalities in the 
different per capita budget groups. In 2000, 85% of “poor” municipalities were 
average investors or operators. 
For 2001, 47% of municipalities, mainly from South – and Middle Trans 
Danubia and from Northern Hungary expected a decrease in the investment 
expenditure rate in their budgets, and among the budget size groups, only the 
“poor” municipalities expected a rise in this rate. This was to be expected because 
these municipalities lag far behind the Hungarian and EU infrastructure standard. 
(The detailed data can be found in Appendix VII.) 
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7.3.1 Investment types 
The most common types of municipal investments are water, sewage and 
road improvements.   Less money is spent on healthcare and gas investments.  
The following figure compares the municipal investment plans of the two 
examined years. 
Figure 6. Municipal investment plans for years 2000 and 2001  
Source: The author’s calculation based on data from the TARKI database 
 
We can see that the number of planned investments increased in the case of 
every investment type, which corresponds with the increase of the median of the 
investment rate.  
Investment data in the different regions are not significantly different from 
the data for the country as a whole.  Plans for water and sewage investments 
outnumber other types, and the planners of such investments are mostly municipal 
associations. 
The investment data according to the per capita budget of the municipality 
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differs from the national average data.  
Forty-five percent of poor municipalities planned water improvements, and 
this figure was higher  (65-70%) for municipalities in the other two categories. 
(The detailed data can be found in Appendix VIII.) 
7.3.2 To form an association or not? 
Municipalities were asked why they form associations and why they remain 
outside associations.  
While 52% of municipalities agreed that assets are easier to operate through 
associations because the continuous financial burden is lower, more than 70 % of 
them agreed that associations are more successful at grant applications than single 
municipalities and that the starting costs of the investments are lower.  
The considerations offered in the questionnaire for not forming associations 
did not prove to be real impediments. These included avoiding financing disputes, 
the ability of the municipality to use the capacity of the asset, and unshared 
responsibility. 
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Figure 7. Municipal arguments for and against associations (%) 
Source: The author’s calculation based on data from the TARKI database 
7.3.3 The financial sources of investments 
Figure 8 illustrates the financial sources of municipal investments. The most 
common sources are regional grants, targeted grants and other centrally allocated 
grants. Other sources, such as privatisation revenues, international grants, 
involvement of the private sector or loans do not play an important role in 
municipal financing. This can be explained by the following facts. Municipal co-
operation with the private sector is not widespread, although it is getting more 
frequent. Municipalities are not able to raise funds on the credit market and, 
furthermore, they do not have experience in developing successful applications for 
international grants – and they are not able to provide the necessary matching part 
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of these grants either. At this point it is worth referring back to the municipalities’ 
expectations about acquiring financing.  The resources that municipalities plan to 
use more are the ones that they expect will be more difficult to gain access to.  
Figure 8. Financing sources of municipal investments for 2000 and 2001. 
Source: The author’s calculation based on data from the TARKI database 
 
7.3.4 Planned sources of financing for the different categories of 
municipalities  
The data for the regions and for the different categories based on the 
investment rates did not differ from the national data. 
The situation is different if we examine the planned financing sources 
according to the per capita budget groups. While only 23% of poor municipalities 
expected targeted grants for their investments, 40% of the rich municipalities did. 
The results are similar for the other centrally and regionally distributed grants.  
The difference can be explained by the conditions attached to the grants, e. 
g., matching funds and minimum number of residents served, which small 
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municipalities are not able to meet (as shown above, these are the poor 
municipalities). 
The differences are even greater in the case of international grants and the 
involvement of the private sector (21%- 43% and 12%-48% respectively in the two 
extreme categories). The reasons for the differences are the same as above. 
(Appendix IX. contains the detailed data.) 
 
7.4 The use of targeted grants in 2000 
In 2000, only 221 municipalities from the sample received targeted grants.  
Due to this small number, the results can only be used as ”soft data”.  
More than two thirds of municipalities were able to make use of less than 
30% of their grants. The proportion of municipalities that were able to use more 
than 30% but less than 70%, is 21%, and only 6% of municipalities could use 
almost the whole amount of the grant.  
Ninety percent of municipalities not applying for targeted grants have fewer 
than 200 inhabitants. 
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Figure 9. The use of targeted grants as percentages of municipalities 
Source: The author’s calculation based on data from the TARKI database 
 
7.5 Loans 
7.5.1 General conditions of loans 
Municipalities were asked about the amount, term and interest of their loans 
in 2000.  Despite the fact that many municipalities did not answer because they did 
not take out any loans, the answers received still make it possible to draw some 
conclusions. 
Municipalities said that the amount of loans increased, the interest rate 
became lower and the term got longer. This indicates that two processes in 
Hungary are taking place. First, the Hungarian municipal credit market offers credit 
products that meet the special requirements of municipalities, so the market 
recognises the municipalities as potential clients. Second, the Hungarian economy 
is stabilising, which makes it possible for banks to offer loans with lower interest 
rates and longer terms. (Appendix X. contains the detailed data) 
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Figure 10. Changes in the terms and interest of municipal loans in 2000 
Source: The author’s calculation based on data from the TARKI database 
This data cannot be examined for the different municipality categories due 
to the small sample size of the groups. 
7.5.2 Guarantee of loans 
Figure 11. shows that the guarantees of municipal loans in most cases are 
immobile assets. 
This is a highly criticised practice of the Hungarian municipal credit 
market. On the one hand, the value of the asset often surpasses many times the 
amount of the loan, and on the other hand, involving an asset into the financing of a 
project, to which it is not otherwise related, is not economically efficient. 
Figure 11. Guarantees of municipal loans in 2000. 
Source: The author’s calculation based on data from the TARKI database 
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income of the municipality. Using taxes for guaranteeing loans is more frequent 
than the use of fees, although the latter would be ideal for that purpose. First, they 
are directly related to the project and second, their flow can be synchronised with 
the repayment structure of the loan. Moreover, in case a municipality would need 
to increase the financial resources for loan repayment, raising fees is normally 
easier than raising the level of municipal taxes.  
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8 USING MULTI-VARIABLE DATA-ANALYSIS FOR ASSESSING 
MUNICIPAL INVESTMENT RATES  
As noted before, I use the data from 2000 for the multi-variable data 
analysis.  
8.1 Common factor analysis 
There are two types of factor analysis, principal component analysis and 
common factor analysis.  
Common factor analysis is generally used to reveal the structure of inter-
dependence among variables, while the main purpose of the principal component 
analysis is to reduce the number of variables. As my goal was to reveal the 
interdependence structure of the variables, I used common factor analysis.  
 
The steps of the analysis 
1. Selecting the variables for the analysis from the database.  
2. Generation of the correlation matrix. 
3. Creating the factors and checking the correspondence of the model. 
The whole database contains the characteristics of every Hungarian 
municipality according to 155 variables and covers areas that are not relevant for 
the current research. (The Questionnaire, as mentioned above, can be found in 
Appendix I.) 
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I included into the analysis those variables that are related to the municipal 
budget and to investments (abbreviations in brackets) 
1. What do the citizens think about the performance of the municipality? 
(citizens1) 
2. What do the citizens think about the future performance of the 
municipality? (citizens2) 
3. The economic situation of the municipality (economy) 
4. What will the economic situation of the municipality be in the future? 
(econ change) 
5. The national economic situation (Nat economy) 
6. What will the national economic situation be in the future? (Nat econ 
change) 
7. Does the municipality plan to raise funds through loans? (Loans) 
8. Expectations about inflation (Inflation) 
9. The number of unemployed (Unemployed) 
10. The number of people on social allowances (Allowances) 
11. Does the municipality plan to decrease the number of municipal 
institutions? (Institutions) 
12. Whether it will be more difficult to get loans (Loans difficult) 
13. Whether it will be more difficult to get central subsidies (Subsidies 
difficult) 
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14. Whether the amount of central subsidies will decrease (Subsidy 
decrease) 
15. The status of the municipality. (Status) 
16. The region the municipality is in (Region) 
17. The investment rate of the municipality (Investment) 
18. The long term loans of the municipality (long term loans) 
19. The investments financed from loans (Loans/investments) 
 
As a first step in the analysis I created a correlation matrix of the variables 
from which it immediately became obvious that there is a correlation among them. 
The correlation matrix can be found in Appendix XI.  
The aim of the common factor analysis is to create factors that contribute to 
the communalities of the variables as much as possible. 
The analysis created the following factors. 
Table 7. The factor matrix 
Factor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Citizens1 0.5 0.44 0.39 0.14 -0.44 -0.18 -0.15 0.09
Citizens2 0.59 0.42 0.36 0.14 -0.36 -0.16 -0.12 0.03
Economy 0.68 0.25 0.11 0.11 0.39 -0.17 0.1 -0.14
Econ change 0.77 0.2 0.04 0.06 0.33 -0.11 0.09 -0.12
Nat economy 0.62 -0.1 0.1 -0.14 0.28 0.3 -0.01 0.32
Nat econ change 0.74 -0.13 0.1 -0.12 0.17 0.28 -0.04 0.21
Loans -0.07 -0.36 0.18 -0.09 0.18 -0.12 -0.25 0.64
Inflation -0.38 0.08 -0.04 0.17 -0.04 -0.4 -0.14 0.41
Unemployed -0.43 0.5 0.28 -0.38 0.05 0.13 0.08 0.07
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Allowances -0.43 0.35 0.44 -0.34 0.15 0.18 0.03 0.03
Institutions -0.15 -0.3 0.29 -0.23 0.02 -0.38 -0.32 -0.12
Loans difficult -0.43 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.14 0.21 -0.07 0.07
Subsidies difficult -0.41 0.19 0.2 0.48 0.41 -0.02 0 -0.06
Subsidy decrease -0.4 0.16 0.27 0.38 0.27 -0.07 0.05 -0.04
Status -0.08 0.57 -0.44 0.14 -0.14 0.27 0.01 0.3
Region -0.15 0.06 0.31 -0.51 -0.12 -0.01 0.4 -0.01
Investment 0.02 -0.15 0.05 0.26 -0.13 -0.2 0.76 0.32
long term loans 0.03 -0.61 0.5 0.22 -0.12 0.11 0.15 -0.09
Loans/investments -0.05 -0.23 0.26 0.37 -0.3 0.55 -0.13 -0.03
 
We see from the above table that behind some of the variables we can 
suspect the same underlying factors, but if we perform a Varimax transformation, 
this interdependence becomes even clearer, and the results will be easier to 
interpret. 
After thirteen rotations we receive the following rotated factor matrix. 
Table 8. Rotated factor matrix 
Factor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Citizens1 0.01 0.91 -0.08 0.02 -0.05 0.04 -0.01 0 
Citizens2 0.22 0.89 -0.08 -0.02 -0.04 0.01 -0.07 0 
Economy 0.65 0.32 0.13 -0.18 0.07 -0.35 -0.24 0.04 
Econ change 0.7 0.31 -0.01 -0.21 0.03 -0.31 -0.25 0.03 
Nat economy 0.78 0.03 -0.22 -0.02 -0.06 0.11 0.19 0 
Nat econ change 0.77 0.13 -0.3 -0.1 -0.01 0.14 0.08 -0.03 
Loans 0.14 -0.12 0 0.01 0.18 0.05 0.8 0.02 
Inflation -0.39 0.08 0.23 -0.05 -0.08 -0.2 0.51 0.09 
Unemployed -0.15 0.03 0.18 0.76 -0.16 -0.1 0.02 -0.11 
Allowances -0.06 -0.03 0.27 0.75 0.01 0.01 0.05 -0.14 
Institutions -0.18 0.02 -0.04 0.05 0.61 -0.1 0.21 -0.22 
Loans difficult -0.13 -0.03 0.51 0.25 -0.16 0.19 0.08 -0.1 
Subsidies difficult -0.08 -0.09 0.8 0 -0.01 0 0.01 0 
Subsidy decrease -0.13 -0.02 0.67 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.08 
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Status -0.1 0.08 0.03 0.02 -0.84 -0.06 0.02 -0.05 
Region -0.05 -0.02 -0.2 0.63 0.18 -0.06 -0.09 0.26 
Investment -0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.04 -0.05 0 0.06 0.9 
Long term loans 0.07 -0.03 0.05 -0.08 0.55 0.56 0.02 0.3 
Loans/investments -0.02 0.06 0.1 -0.09 -0.02 0.8 -0.04 -0.05 
 
8.1.1 Explaining the factors 
The factors are as follows: 
 
1. Factor – the economy factor  
- The economic situation of the municipality (economy) 
- What will the economic situation of the municipality be in the future? 
(econ change) 
- The national economic situation (Nat economy) 
- What will the national economic situation be in the future? (Nat econ 
change) 
If the municipality expects a change in the national economy, it hopes for a 
change in its own economic situation too. They evaluate their own situation as it is 
reflected in the national situation. 
 
2. Factor – municipal performance factor 
- What do the citizens think about the performance of the municipality? 
(citizens1) 
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- What do the citizens think about the performance of the municipality in 
the future? (citizens2) 
 
3. Factor – the factor of market conditions 
- Whether it will be more difficult to get loans (Loans difficult) 
- Whether it will be more difficult to get central subsidies (Subsidies 
difficult) 
- Whether the amount of central subsidies will decrease (Subsidy 
decrease) 
According to the municipal decision makers, acquiring financing– either 
through loans or central subsidies - will be more difficult in the future, as the 
conditions for winning loan or subsidy applications become similar. Municipalities 
recognised that economic efficiency is a crucial criterion not only in the private, 
but also in the public sector. 
 
4. Factor – The factor of social conditions 
- The number of unemployed (Unemployed) 
- The number of people on social allowances (Allowances) 
- The region the municipality is in (Region) 
The number of unemployed and the number of people on allowances 
depend on the job opportunities the municipality can offer. The fact that the third 
variable in this factor is the region instead of, for example, the status or the size of 
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the municipality, tells us that a small municipality in a “better-off” region is still in 
a better economic situation than a bigger municipality in a less favoured region. 
This proves that economic development programs work best on the regional level. 
 
5. Factor – The factor of rationalisation 
- Does the municipality plan to decrease the number of municipal 
institutions? (Institutions) 
- The status of the municipality (Status) 
The population of a municipality is in close correlation with the status of the 
municipality (Village, Town, City with county rights). The rationalisation of the 
administration is related to the size of the settlement -- the bigger the municipality, 
the more probable it will want to decrease the number of institutions. The reason is 
probably that smaller municipalities already did that.  
  
6. Factor – The factor of the external sources 
- The long term loans of the municipality (long term loans) 
- The investments financed from loans (Loans/investments) 
Use of loans and the proportion of investments financed from loans should 
be dependent on each other in a developed economy. 
 
7. Factor – The tactic players factor 
- Expectations about inflation (Inflation) 
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- Whether the municipality plans to raise funds through loans (Loans) 
When municipalities decide on whether to raise funds through loans or not, 
they take inflation into account. 
  
8.factor – The factor of loan financing 
- The investments financed from loans (Loans/investments) 
- The long term loans of the municipality (long term loans) 
If the investment rate is high in a particular municipality’s budget, then the 
amount of long term loans will be high too. This is related to the fact that, although 
in Hungary municipalities still take out loans for financing current expenditures, 
the main purpose of long-term loans is investment financing. This supports the idea 
to create an institution for enhancing municipal credit market activity in Hungary. 
 
The maximum number of factors is 13 based on the following formula 
M=1/2*((2n+1)+8n+1), 
but because the Eigenvalues of factors are above 1 only in the case of 8 factors, the 
final number will be 8 (Kaiser criterion). 
The following table summarises the Eigenvalues and communalities of the 
factors. It also shows that the factors explain 67,7% of the total variance of the 
variables.  
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Table 9. The Eigenvalues and communalities of the factors  
Communality Factor Eigenvalue Explained variance Accumulated variance 
0.86 1 3.67 19.3 19.3 
0.85 2 2.00 10.5 29.9 
0.76 3 1.49 7.8 37.7 
0.79 4 1.39 7.3 45.0 
0.70 5 1.18 6.2 51.2 
0.74 6 1.11 5.8 57.0 
0.71 7 1.03 5.4 62.4 
0.53 8 1.01 5.3 67.7 
 
 
8.1.2 Examining the correspondence of the factor models 
In order to check if the factor model is working or not, I reproduced the 
correlation matrix, the communalities and the residual correlation matrix, which 
can be found in Appendix XII.  
Below the diagonal is the reproduced correlation matrix, in the diagonal the 
communalities, and above the diagonal, the residuals. 
As can be seen, the model reproduced the correlation matrix, meaning that 
it works well. 
  
8.2 Multivariable regression analysis 
With the help of multivariable regression analysis what kind of relationship 
exists between dependent and independent variables can be defined.  
In the model the independent variable is the investment rate of the 
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municipality. 
The steps of analysis: 
1. Choose the grouping variable in order to create municipal groups for which 
groups the regression equations will be defined. 
2. Choose the independent variables and create the correlation matrix. (The 
independent variables must be non-correlated.)  
3. Determine the regression coefficients.  
  
8.2.1 The unit of the research 
First, I grouped the municipalities in order to create the appropriate sized 
units for the analysis. Choices for the grouping variable were the region (or other 
smaller territorial unit) or the size of the municipality.  
“One specific characteristic of regional development policy – as opposed to 
the macro-level policy - is that it emphasises the advantages of the different levels 
of intervention. Different needs can be articulated at macro- and mezo-regional 
levels, at county and micro-regional levels. This means that for the implementation 
of regional development programs or policies we have to find the adequate regional 
level from the above possibilities.” (Csatári, [1996] (translated by the author)) 
As a basis for research, the level of settlements is not adequate due to the 
fragmentation of the settlement system. At the other end of the scale, research at 
the national level would not allow an examination of regional differences. 
What is left is the level of micro-regions, the counties and the regions, 
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which are examined in the following sections.  
The level of micro-regions 
„The micro-regions can be considered …such planning and development 
units that mainly satisfy the everyday needs of rural areas related to …their 
economic, social, and infrastructural relationships. ...Their main objectives are 
regional development that is tied to the local identity, and to enhance co-operation 
among municipalities. They elaborate development plans, raise and co-ordinate 
financing, help achieve co-operation between villages and towns. They realise 
regional improvements while ensuring local and regional identity...” (Csatári, 
[1996] (translated by the author)) 
In Hungary, there are 150 micro-regions, which form 5 groups according to 
their development level: (1) dynamic developers, (2) developers, (3) catching-up 
regions, (4) stagnating regions and (5) falling behind regions (Faluvégi [2000]). If 
the level of micro regions is chosen as the level of research, municipalities may be 
grouped according to which of the above five categories they belong to.  
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The micro regions in Hungary are illustrated in Figure 12. 
Figure 12. The micro regions in Hungary  
Source: Albert Faluvégi. [2000.] www.ksh.hu 
 
The level of the county and the regions 
It is not by any chance that these two levels are discussed together, as it is 
often said that creating regions would diminish the power of the counties. 
 „No one argues that the regional structure works more efficiently when 
fulfilling administrative tasks than the county structure. If functional and statistical 
regions will be created in Hungary, then devising local administration and central 
administrative tasks will be the easiest at the regional level. Accordingly, in the 
future the ministerial regional offices should be set up at the regional level, while 
the local, decentralized administrative tasks should be carried out by county 
government, which supposes the division of administrative tasks and power in this 
aspect too.” (Szegvári [1997], pp. 4. (Translated by the author)). 
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One reason for creating the regions was to create territorial units that are 
comparable with the EU structure (NUTS II level, which would cover three to five 
Hungarian counties). Another reason for their creation was that the appropriate 
level of intervention to achieve change in the economic structure of the country is 
above the county level, because the co-ordination of resources needed for any 
change is easier at the regional level, and because the co-ordination of medium- 
and long-term programs requires a bigger unit than a county.  
 
After examining the possibilities, I decided to create models for (i) the 
regions, (ii) the groups created based on the size of the municipalities, and (iii) the 
development groups of micro regions.  
 
8.2.2 Choosing the variables of the regression equation 
I wanted to analyse the effects on the investment rate of the following 
variables:  
In 2000 
- The sum of current revenues; 
- The amount of normatives; 
- The amount of the business turnover tax and the tax on tourism;  
- The amount of the communal tax and property tax; 
- The investment revenues; 
- The privatisation revenues; 
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- The revenue from financial investments; 
- The amount of state investment subsidies; 
- The amount of current expenditures; 
- The amount of investment expenditures; 
- The long term loans; 
- The sum of loans. 
These are numeric variables, the basic requirement of regression analysis. 
The other requirement of the analysis is that the variables should not correlate (or 
the correlation should be as small as possible, as zero correlation is very rare in 
reality). After examining whether the variables correlated (the correlation table is 
in Appendix XIII), I decided to leave out several of the variables from the analysis 
because of the level of correlation. 
The variables remaining after the correlation test are as follows: 
In 2000 
- The revenue from the tax on tourism and from the business 
turnover tax (the local tax revenues);  
- Central investment subsidies (state subsidies); 
- The amount of long term loans (loans). 
Table 10. illustrates that although there is some correlation among these 
variables as well, it is so small that performing the analysis is still possible. 
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Table 10. The correlation table of the independent variables. (p=0,05)  
 Local taxes State subsidies  Loans 
Local taxes 1 
N=2280 
0,06 
N=1602 
0,059 
N=1494 
State subsidies  0,007 
N=1602 
1 
N=1875 
0,008 
N=1303 
Loans 0,09 
N=1494 
0,006 
N=1303 
1 
N=1690 
 
8.3 Defining the determinants of the regression equations and analysing the 
results 
The equations for the municipal groups are based on the population, the 
region and the development level of the micro region the municipality belongs to. 
 
8.3.1 Regression based on the population of the municipalities 
The categories are as follows:  
- Population below one thousand  
- Population between one and two thousand  
- Population between two and five thousand  
- Population between five and ten thousand  
- Population between ten and twenty thousand  
- Population between twenty and fifty thousand  
- Population between fifty and one hundred thousand  
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- Population above one hundred thousand  
 
The variables in each case are the same:  
X1 = business turnover tax and tax on tourism 
X2 = central investment subsidy 
X3 = loans 
I. Municipalities with a population below 1000 (N= 513) 
Regression equation: 
Y = 0,17 - 0,0021*X1 + 1.89837E-04* X2 +  0,007 * X3 
  R2 =18,88   
F = 39,53 Signif F =  0,00 
Variable Beta T Sig T 
Business turnover tax and tax 
on tourism  
-3,18 -5 0,00 
Central investment subsidy  0,38 9,47 0,00 
Loans 3,25 5,11 0,00 
Constant  20,8 0,00 
 
II. Municipalities with a population between 1000 and 2000 (N= 248) 
Regression equation: 
Y = 0,156 – 9,16E-06*X1 – 4,995E-05*X2 + 0,003*X3 
R2 =0,06   
F = 5,22       Signif F = 0,00 
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Variable Beta T Sig T 
Business turnover tax and tax 
on tourism  
-0,1 -1,55 0,12 
Central investment subsidy  -5,86 -1,88 0,06 
Loans 6,04 1,95 0,05 
Constant  11,79 0,00 
 
III. Municipalities with a population between 2000 and 5000 (N=173) 
Regression equation: 
Y = 0,15 + 8,3E-04*X1 + 0,001*X2 – 0,002*X3 
R2 =0,18  
F = 12,62 Signif F =  0,00 
Variable Beta T Sig T 
Business turnover tax and tax 
on tourism  
0,33 4,62 0,00 
Central investment subsidy  6,16 4,28 0,00 
Loans -6,24 -4,34 0,00 
Constant  13,533 0,00 
 
IV. Municipalities with a population between 5000 and 10000 (N=93) 
Regression equation: 
Y= 0,22 – 9.94E-04*X1 + 4.06E-04*X2 + 0,001*X3 
R2 =0,5    
F = 28.62 Signif F =  0,00 
Variable Beta T Sig T 
Business turnover tax and tax 
on tourism  
-0,33 -3,74 0,00 
Central investment subsidy  0,8 9,01 0,00 
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Loans 0,15 1,96 0,05 
Constant  9,248 0,00 
 
V. Municipalities with a population between 10000 and 20000 (N=32) 
Regression equation: 
Y = 0.13 – 8,71E-05*X1 + 7,12E-04*X2 – 1,77E-06*X3 
R2 =0,2   
F = 2.42 Signif F =  0,09 
Variable Beta T Sig T 
Business turnover tax and tax 
on tourism  
-0,1 -0,5 0,6 
Central investment subsidy  0,47 2,5 0,01 
Loans 0,06 -0,33 0,7 
Constant  2,73 0,74 
 
VI. Municipalities with a population between 20000 and 50000 (N=19) 
Regression equation: 
Y = 2,29 – 4,83 E-05*X1 – 3,17 E-04*X2 + 2,29*X3 
R2 =0,8 
F = 25,9 Signif F =  0,00 
Variable Beta T Sig T 
Business turnover tax and tax 
on tourism  
-0,5 -4,5 0,00 
Central investment subsidy  -0,61 -5,5 0,00 
Loans 0,64 6 0,00 
Constant  16,31 0,00 
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VII. Municipalities with a population between 50000 and 100000 
(N=11) 
Regression equation: 
Y= 0,23 +  5,77 E-05*X1 – 0,001*X2 – 4,24E -04*X3 
R2 =0,97 
F = 72,4 Signif F =  0,00 
Variable Beta T Sig T 
Business turnover tax and tax 
on tourism  
0,98 6,38 0,00 
Central investment subsidy  -0,81 -9,37 0,00 
Loans -1,73 -11,2 0,00 
Constant  36,93 0,00 
 
VIII. Municipalities with a population above 100000 (N=10) 
Regression equation: 
Y= - 0,13 + 8,35 E-05*X1 + 6,18 E-05*X2 – 1,74 E-05*X3 
R2 =0,27  
F = 0.75 Signif F =  0,56 
Variable Beta T Sig T 
Business turnover tax and tax 
on tourism  
0,69 1,38 0,22 
Central investment subsidy  0,42 1,06 0,33 
Loans -0,28 -0,64 0,56 
Constant  -0,72 0,5 
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8.3.2 Regression in the groups based on developmental levels of the micro 
regions 
The groups are as follows (Faluvégi, 1998) 
- Micro regions that are falling behind  
- Stagnating micro regions 
- Catching up micro regions 
- Developing micro regions 
- Dynamically developing micro regions 
 
I. Falling behind micro regions (N= 184) 
Regression equation: 
Y = 0,14 – 7,93 E-06*X2 + 0,001*X3 – 2,48 E-06*X3 
R2 = 0,33 
F = 29,3 Signif F = 0,00 
Variable Beta T Sig T 
Business turnover tax and tax 
on tourism  
-0,07 -1,17 0,24 
Central investment subsidy  0,56 9,22 0,00 
Loans -0,03 -0,46 0,65 
Constant  9,8 0,00 
 
II. Stagnating micro regions (N= 189) 
Regression equation: 
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Y= 0,2 – 1,09 E-05*X1 + 2,82 E-06*X2 – 5,55 E-05*X3 
R2 =0,05 
F = 3,46 Signif F = 0,02 
Variable Beta T Sig T 
Business turnover tax and tax 
on tourism  
-0,08 -1,13 0,26 
Central investment subsidy  0,35 2,88 0,00 
Loans -0,19 -1,61 0,1 
Constant  12,66 0,00 
 
III. Catching up micro regions (N= 329) 
Regression equation: 
Y= 0,16 – 3,81 E-04*X1 + 0,001* X2 – 3,442 E-04*X3 
R2 =0,05 
F = 6,90 Signif F =0,00 
Variable Beta T Sig T 
Business turnover tax and tax 
on tourism  
-0,13 -1,78 0,07 
Central investment subsidy  0,35 3,68 0,00 
Loans -0,04 -0,53 0,6 
Constant  15,95 0,00 
 
IV. Developing micro regions (N= 168) 
Regression equation: 
Y= 0,17 – 1,66 E-04*X1 + 4,8 E-04*X2 + 2,23 E-04*X3 
R2 =0,03 
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F = 1,95 Signif F = 0,12 
Variable Beta T Sig T 
Business turnover tax and tax 
on tourism  
-0,59 -2,36 0,01 
Central investment subsidy  0,29 2,15 0,03 
Loans 0,43 2,03 0,04 
Constant  12,66 0,00 
 
V. Dynamically developing micro regions (N= 230) 
Regression equation: 
Y= 0,18 – 5,31 E-05*X1 + 7,59 E-04*X2 + 2,85 E-07*X3 
R2 =0,09 
F = 7,46 Signif F = 0,00 
Variable Beta T Sig T 
Business turnover tax and tax 
on tourism  
-0,16 -2,19 0,02 
Central investment subsidy  0,32 4,63 0,00 
Loans 0,09 1,37 0,17 
Constant  14,34 0,00 
 
8.3.3 Regression in the different regions 
The results are as follows: 
 
I. Central Hungary (N= 68) 
Regression equation: 
Y= 0,18 – 0,002*X1 + 0,001* X2 + 0,003*X3 
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R2 =0,45 
F = 17,55 Signif F =  .00 
Variable Beta T Sig T 
Business turnover tax and tax 
on tourism  
-0,81 -5,43 0,00 
Central investment subsidy  0,73 6,75 0,00 
Loans 0,47 3,5 0,00 
Constant  6,97 0,00 
 
II. Central Trans-Danubia (N= 176) 
Regression equation: 
Y= 0,166 + 1,68 E-04*X1 + 1,92 E-04* X2 – 3,56 E-04*X3 
R2 =0,02 
F = 1,44       Signif F =  0,22 
Variable Beta T Sig T 
Business turnover tax and tax 
on tourism  
0,33 1,66 0,1 
Central investment subsidy  0,93 1,66 0,1 
Loans -1,07 -1,82 0,07 
Constant  12,38 0,00 
 
III. Western Trans-Danubia (N= 189) 
Regression equation: 
Y= 0,14 – 3,62 E-05*X1 + 0,002* X2 + 8,811 E-04*X3 
R2 =0,52 
F = 3,39 Signif F =  0,02 
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Variable Beta T Sig T 
Business turnover tax and tax 
on tourism  
-0,11 -1,13 0,26 
Central investment subsidy  0,13 1,63 0,1 
Loans 0,2 1,78 0,07 
Constant  13,82 0,00 
 
IV. Southern Trans-Danubia (N= 214) 
Regression equation: 
Y= 0,17 – 4,15 E-05*X1 + 0,0011*X2 – 3,63 E-05*X3 
R2 =0,04 
F = 3,53 Signif F =  0,02 
Variable Beta T Sig T 
Business turnover tax and tax 
on tourism  
-0,32 -3,05 0,00 
Central investment subsidy  0,31 2,99 0,00 
Loans 0,01 0,19 0,85 
Constant  11,94 0,00 
 
V. Northern Hungary (N= 202) 
Regression equation: 
Y= 0,24 – 1,61 E-05*X1 + 1,37*X2 + 1,28 E-07*X3 
R2 =0,03 
F = 2,02 Signif F =  0,11 
Variable Beta T Sig T 
Business turnover tax and tax 
on tourism  
-0,11 -1,61 0,1 
Central investment subsidy  0,14 1,93 0,06 
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Loans 0,03 0,45 0,6 
Constant  12,99 0,00 
 
VI. Northern -Great Plain (N= 133) 
Regression equation: 
Y= 0,08 – 5,03 E-05*X1 + 0,002*X2 – 6,46 E-07*X3 
R2 =0,69 
F = 98,9 Signif F = 0,00 
Variable Beta T Sig T 
Business turnover tax and tax 
on tourism  
-0,14 -2,92 0,00 
Central investment subsidy  0,84 17,2 0,00 
Loans -0,12 -0,24 0,81 
Constant  9,62 0,00 
 
VII. Southern -Great Plain  (N=117)  
Regression equation: 
Y= 0,12 – 6,8 E-05*X1 + 5,24 E-04*X2 – 1,38 E-05*X3 
R2 =0,11  
F = 4.78 Signif F = 0,00 
Variable Beta T Sig T 
Business turnover tax and tax 
on tourism  
-0,28 -0,68 0,5 
Central investment subsidy  0,48 3 0,00 
Loans 0,17 0,36 0,97 
Constant  11,57 0,00 
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8.3.4 Evaluating the results and examining the parameters of the equations 
When evaluating the results, we take into account the values of the F-test 
that serves for checking the correspondence the model, and the values of the T-test, 
that is for checking the parameters of the equations. If these values are below 0,05, 
we can say that the regression model is working well. Another important element 
of the examination of the model is checking the R2, which is the explained 
deviation. 
In the five micro regions’ groups and in the seven regions the significance 
level of the F- and T-tests are above 0,05 in several cases, and the value of the R2 is 
too low. 
In the groups based on the population of the municipalities the model works 
well in most cases. The results are questionable in the case of the bigger 
municipalities, possibly due to the small sample. However, the population of 95% 
of Hungarian municipalities is below 10000. 
The significance levels are below 0,05 (even 0,01) in most cases, so the 
zero hypothesis of the regression analysis, according to which there is no 
relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable, does 
not apply. 
This mans that if the government wanted to raise the investment level in the 
smaller municipalities, it can do so by changing one or more of the independent 
variables (the local tax policy, central subsidies, and loan activity). 
The effects of the change of the variables are different in the different 
groups. In municipalities smaller than 10000 inhabitants, the independent variables 
explain 25-50% of the deviations of the dependent variable, while in the bigger 
 131  
municipalities, they explain as much as 80-90%. 
As a consequence, when the extent and the direction of the effect of the 
independent variables are examined, we can see that municipalities below and 
above 10000 inhabitants should be distinguished. 
The rise in the amount of local taxes and central subsidies usually means a 
rise in the investment rate in both groups. 
The loan activity has different effects in the case of smaller municipalities 
and in the case of bigger municipalities. While in the smaller municipalities the rise 
in the amount of loans means a rise in the investment activity, in the bigger 
municipalities the result is just the opposite. If a municipality has more loans, it is 
more likely that it will have a lower investment rate. 
The reasons are (i) the difference among the financial resources available to 
the two groups, (ii) the preferences of the central subsidy policy and (iii) the 
expenditure structure of investments.  
- Bigger municipalities usually have more income from the 
business turnover tax than smaller ones and they also have the 
opportunity to co-operate with private companies in 
infrastructure projects. These options are not available for small 
municipalities, meaning that smaller municipalities have to take 
out loans in order to substitute for these sources of financing. 
- A minimum requirement for receiving state subsidies for 
investments is a population served by the asset of a minimum of 
10000 people. The big municipalities easily meet this 
requirement, while the smaller ones have to form municipal 
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associations, which takes time and energy. (As the population of 
65% of municipalities is below 3000, many municipalities have 
to co-operate with at least two other partners.) 
- Big investments have high fixed costs, which put a bigger 
burden on the budget of a smaller municipality. Thus, when 
smaller municipalities start investments, they are more likely to 
have cash-flow problems, and may have to take out loans later in 
the project for financing other municipal tasks. 
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9 THE INSTITUTION FOR ENHANCING MUNICIPAL CREDIT MARKET 
PARTICIPATION 
 
Based on the conclusions of the previous chapter, municipal investment 
behaviour depends mostly on the size of the municipality, and in 95% of 
municipalities there is a positive relationship between the long-term loans of the 
municipality and its investment rate. This means that the creation of an institution 
enhancing municipal credit market activity would also have a positive effect on 
municipal investments. 
The institution could operate as a guarantee fund, bank, or development 
agency. The setting up of this institution is in the interest of municipalities, banks 
with municipal clients (the local government sector represents potential bank 
customers, which, although higher risk, could provide good returns if market tools 
reducing risks are used in municipal lending), and the state itself (this would 
broaden the possibilities for financing local investments, and would decrease the 
pressure on the central budget). 
Municipalities would be free to participate in the guarantee fund. The most 
important characteristic of the guarantee institution is mutuality. Co-operation 
between municipalities creates stronger actors in the market than they would 
comprise separately, if they acted individually in the marketplace. As a 
consequence they could negotiate better loan conditions.  
A highly criticised element of lending activity is the fact that collateral for 
loans may consist of immobile assets not directly related to the purpose of the 
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loans. One advantage of creating the municipal guarantee institution is that these 
municipal assets could be used for other purposes or could be sold. Although in the 
past one trend was to create entrepreneur municipalities, this has lately been 
criticised, because municipal enterprises are often too risky, and they take away the 
municipality’s capacity from obligatory tasks, making its operation less efficient. 
With this kind of guarantee, the administrative costs of the loans would 
decrease, as the risks would be spread out among several actors on the market. As 
the municipalities are responsible for each other’s debt (mutuality), they would 
force each other to be more diligent, which would lead to more secure municipal 
debt and better financial management.  
 
9.1 The two-level system 
Based on international experience a two-level system would best serve the 
enhancement of municipal credit market participation. The first level would consist 
of the guarantee institutions of municipalities, while the second level would be a 
state counter-guarantee fund. 
9.1.1 The guarantee institutions 
The task of the guarantee institutions would be to guarantee the loans of 
member municipalities. According to Act CXII (1996) on financial institutions, 
offering guarantees as a business activity can only be done by financial institutions. 
The same law says that the form of financial institutions can only be a shared 
company or a co-operative. The Act I (1992) on co-operatives provides that among 
the members of a co-operative the number of legal persons cannot surpass the 
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number of natural persons. As a consequence, the co-operative is not feasible as a 
form of the institution because of the municipal owners.  
An important question related to the guarantee institutions is their number. 
It may be useful to create several institutions based on the special requirements of 
the municipal groups. Institutions would be created for fulfilling the needs of the 
smaller municipalities, others for the bigger investments of bigger municipalities, 
and another for investments that involve foreign financing, such as PHARE or 
other EU funds. The minimum equity of each institution must be 50 million HUF 
according to law27. (Apatini – Barati – Koncz in Barati [2001] pp. 113.) 
9.1.2 The guarantee fund 
The state guarantee fund would stand behind the guarantee institutions. This 
is in accordance with the international practice, and Hungary also provides a 
positive example, as the Small Entrepreneurs’ Guarantee Fund functioned this way. 
This is also in accordance with EU rules, as it is possible to get financing from the 
Structural Funds for the purpose of establishing and replenishing guarantee funds 
of the member states.  
According to Hungarian legislation, funds can only be created by passing a 
law regulating the management and operation of the fund and determining its 
relationship to the central budget. 
The assets of the fund would not be divided among the guarantee 
institutions, but its balance would be calculated based on the accumulated need of 
the member institutions. 
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9.1.3 Funding, financial requirements 
The state counter-guarantee fund would be owned by the state. 
The guarantee institutions would be owned by the municipalities and others, 
such as the state and representatives of the banking sector. In order to enhance 
municipal ownership, the guarantee service would be offered only to the member 
(owner) municipalities. At the beginning of its operation, municipalities would 
represent about 50% of the ownership shares, while the banking sector and the state 
would each hold 25% of the shares. Later, these proportions would change in 
favour of the municipalities. 
The advantage to municipalities to participate in the institution is a high 
level guarantee on their loans. The banks’ interest is to enforce safe lending and 
guarantee rules that harmonise with their business policy, and the state’s interest is 
to manage risk and minimise the losses of the guarantee fund. 
In order to decide the equity needs of the system, one must assess the 
maximum level of loans the institutions can guarantee and for that one must assess 
the planned rate of failure.  
In Hungary, the latter would be 12,5% at the beginning (normally, it is 
lower, but when starting a new business a cautious approach is needed). 
Using the multiplier known from economic literature (1 / rate of failure) if 
the planned failure rate is 12,5%, then the maximum loans guaranteed can not be 
higher than the equity of the institutions multiplied by eight. This means that if we 
suppose a 100 billion HUF loan demand on the municipalities’ side, then the 
resources needed to start the system is 10 billion HUF, 7 billion in the state 
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counter-guarantee fund and 3 billion in the guarantee institutions. (Apatini –Barati 
– Koncz in Barati [2001] pp. 129-130.) 
 
9.2 The services offered by the guarantee institutions 
The basic service offered by the institutions would be guarantees on 
municipal loans, but with time other services could be added. The state guarantee 
fund would only offer guarantee services. 
When sharing risk, it is important to decide how much risk one actor should 
bear. Of course, every actor has to bear some part of the total risk. Since in 
Hungary guarantee institutions offer 80% guarantees and the state counter-
guarantee fund offers a 70% counter-guarantee, and this model works well, it is 
worth considering continuing this tradition.  
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The risk sharing among the actors is as follows:  
Figure 13. Risk sharing in the guarantee system 
 
 
  
 
Source: Apatini – Barati – Koncz. [2001]. The Municipal Guarantee Program. In: Barati. 
pp. 121.  
 
The institutions would invest municipal payments, and would create a 
reserve fund (similar to the Holland Municipal Bank) which would only be used if 
a municipality were not able to meet its obligations. Of course, this municipality 
would have to pay the “loan” back into the reserve fund based on an emergency 
scenario developed for the municipality. This is the guarantee that the interests of 
other member municipalities will not be hurt. 
 
 
 
The possible services offered by the institutions are as follows: 
Total risks of loan  
100% 
Risk of the Bank 
20% 
Risk taken by Guarantee Institution + Fund 
80%  
Guarantee 
Institution  
24%
Guarantee Fund 
56% 
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9.2.1 Consulting 
In this aspect the Hungarian guarantee institutions would not be different 
from the international examples, as their services include a wide range of banking 
and consulting services. Municipalities have to hire costly experts in different areas 
in order to plan and realise a project, for which it might not have the necessary 
capacities.  
The employees of the institutions could take part in elaborating contracts for 
the municipalities, ensuring that the „vis major” (when it is not possible to 
determine who is responsible for the failure of the project) cases in the contracts 
are minimised. 28 
The employees of the fund could also help the municipality when applying 
for international funding, ensuring that the applications meet the formal 
requirements of the international funds. 
The guarantee fund could also take part in finding investors for the project, 
as through its other partners it would have a broad knowledge of the market.  
9.2.2 Credit rating 
Credit rating agencies are important institutions for developing municipal 
credit markets. The availability of municipal budget data, strategic plans, and 
economic and social data is essential for rating municipalities. The services of 
international rating agencies are very expensive, and municipalities do not 
understand their importance yet. The guarantee institution would have to make a 
credit assessment of the risks it is taking when providing the guarantee. This could 
be an initial step for the general rating of the municipalities. 
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9.2.3 International loans 
International organisations would probably prefer to allocate their money to 
a municipality that was rated by the guarantee institution and that was secured by 
it. They would also have more confidence if the staff of the guarantee institution 
would have given their opinion on the project previously, and would monitor the 
realisation of the development project to its completion. 
The guarantee institution could also be a channel for international (and 
national) subsidies and would make it possible to rationalise the cash flow of the 
project. 
9.2.4 Offering loans and issuing bonds 
If the institution would work as a bank, it would also be possible for it to 
issue bonds, and its function would be similar to that of a bond bank. It would buy 
bonds issued by municipalities, and would issue its own bonds, covered by the 
income flow from the repayment of the municipal bonds.  
9.2.5 Fees for services 
If the institutions would offer such services, the income from fees could 
cover a substantial part of its financing needs. The fees would be differentiated for 
member municipalities and for non-members. 
. 
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SUMMARY 
 
Among the Central European transition economies, Hungary was one of the 
firsts to reform its municipal system, to introduce rules accelerating the 
decentralisation process. The reforms concerned the relationship between the 
public and the private sectors, the service provision and the financing mechanisms 
of municipalities. But despite the changes, there are still many problems to be 
solved.  
There is a big gap between the environmental and infrastructural situations 
of the current and future member countries of the European Union. In order to 
reduce this gap, according to the co-operation agreement with the EU, Hungary has 
to improve its infrastructural and environmental situation. According to 
conservative calculations, in the environmental sector alone some 6,8-7,6 billion 
euros will have to be spent in order to solve the problems (Kerekes – Kiss [1998] 
pp 23.). 
On the other hand, it is not only the EU that urges these improvements. 
They are necessary in order to avoid future environmental problems, and the level 
of services is not sustainable with the current physical infrastructure. The 
decentralisation process also pushes local governments to make these 
developments.  
In an investment process an important question concerns the financial 
sources. When talking about investment financing sources, the first one that 
financial officers usually think of is the “cheapest” one -- the central or regional 
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subsidy. Next is the municipality’s own revenues that are available in the budget 
(income from privatisation), then subsidised loans, and finally, market loans. The 
involvement of the public sector as partners in financing is also more frequent. 
 Some municipal infrastructure investments in the long term generate revenue 
directly through service fees (such as water and sewage investments) while 
others contribute to local development (such as road investments). As a 
consequence, infrastructure investments should be financed from loans (Bird - 
Tassonyi [2001]). 
  
Municipalities and the loan market 
Even in countries where municipalities are free to participate in credit 
market transactions, the central government might set limits for municipal 
borrowing. This is needed because the market often assumes the existence of 
central guarantees of local debt, even where not explicit, which might seriously 
undermine the creditworthiness of the state. Other reasons for central intervention 
are: (i) local borrowing raises the cost of capital for the private sector; (ii) the state 
might compete for the same resources as the municipalities and (iii) it worsens the 
balance of the central budget. 
On the other hand, to some extent the state might support municipal 
borrowing. The reasons are: 
Local borrowing decreases the financial burden on the central budget. 
(i) Local borrowing decreases the financial burden on the central 
budget. 
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(ii) Loans are usually more efficient than grants (the efficiency of 
capital increases). 
(iii) Municipalities realise improvements from loans that are closer to the 
needs of citizens as compared to grants.  
(iv) The repayment of the debt can last the whole lifetime of the realised 
asset. 
(v) Local borrowing provides a good investment opportunity for the 
local financial market, pension funds and insurance funds.  
Hungarian laws about municipal borrowing leave a great deal of freedom to 
municipalities, but they do not take advantage of this opportunity. 
One reason is that other municipal revenues such as central grants and 
income from privatisation proved to be enough in the last ten years and the fiscal 
behaviour of the typical municipal financial officer could be characterised by 
conservatism. (Barati [1999]). The other reason is that in case there is no state 
guarantee on municipal debt, then there is a strong market control on borrowing. In 
Hungary, the state does not repay municipal debt, so municipalities can raise loans 
if they meet the criteria set by the lender. 
As Hungarian municipalities do not meet the market criteria, they are in a 
very difficult situation, as the due to the lack of traditional financial sources, but 
also based on economic rationality, they will have to use loans for their 
investments. 
 
Municipalities need the assistance of the state to become creditworthy. The 
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central government has two main tasks related to the creditworthiness of 
municipalities. First, it has to keep its own creditworthiness as high as possible in 
order to maintain the creditworthiness of the municipalities and secondly, it has to 
create the institutional and legal background for municipal credit market 
participation. 
Based on international experiences, if we decrease the risks associated with 
municipal lending, we can help the development of credit markets and as a 
consequence, the local investments. 
 
Based on the data from 1999-2000 in the TÁRKI database, the investment 
activity of municipalities changes according to the geographical situation, the 
economic situation and the size of the municipality. The availability of the data 
made it possible to perform factor and regression analysis, and to define what kind 
of relation exists between the investment rate of a municipality and the independent 
variables, such as state subsidies, the amount of long term loans and local taxes. 
  
The descriptive analysis 
Investments 
The most common types of municipal investments are water, sewage and 
road improvements.   Less money is spent on healthcare and gas investments. The 
planners of water and sewage treatment plants are mostly municipal associations. 
Municipalities were asked why they form associations and why they remain 
outside associations.  
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While 52% of municipalities agreed that assets are easier to operate through 
associations because the continuous financial burden is lower, more than 70 % of 
them agreed that associations are more successful at grant applications than single 
municipalities and that the starting costs of the investments are lower.  
Consequently, municipalities appreciate associations more for their ease of 
receiving investment money than for the lower operating costs of investments made 
through them.  
 
The sources of investments 
The most common sources are regional grants, targeted grants and other 
centrally allocated grants. Other sources, such as privatisation revenues, 
international grants, involvement of the private sector or loans do not play an 
important role in municipal financing. This can be explained by the following facts. 
Municipal co-operation with the private sector is not widespread, although it is 
getting more frequent. Municipalities are not able to raise funds on the credit 
market and, furthermore, they do not have experience in developing successful 
applications for international grants – and they are not able to provide the necessary 
matching part of these grants either.  
Conditions of loans 
Municipalities were asked about the amount, term and interest of their loans 
in 2000.  They said that the amount of loans increased, the interest rate became 
lower and the term got longer. This indicates that two processes in Hungary are 
taking place. First, the Hungarian municipal credit market offers credit products 
that meet the special requirements of municipalities, so the market recognises the 
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municipalities as potential clients. Second, the Hungarian economy is stabilising, 
which makes it possible for banks to offer loans with lower interest rates and 
longer terms. 
The guarantees of municipal loans in most cases are immobile assets. This 
is a highly criticised practice of the Hungarian municipal credit market. On the one 
hand, the value of the asset often surpasses many times the amount of the loan, and 
on the other hand, involving an asset into the financing of a project, to which it is 
not otherwise related, is not economically efficient. 
Other options for backing municipal loans include the tax or service fee 
income of the municipality. Using taxes for guaranteeing loans is more frequent 
than the use of fees, although the latter would be ideal for that purpose. First, they 
are directly related to the project and second, their flow can be synchronised with 
the repayment structure of the loan. Moreover, in case a municipality would need 
to increase the financial resources for loan repayment, raising fees is normally 
easier than raising the level of municipal taxes.  
 
Multi-variable data analysis 
With the help of factor and multivariable regression analysis my goal was to 
reveal the interdependence structure of the variables, and to reveal what kind of 
relationship exists between dependent and independent variables.  
The regression equation provides an efficient tool in investment policy, as 
its determinants show which variable has a greater effect on the value of 
investments. As a consequence, investment-enhancing programs can be customised 
for specific regions, taking into account those areas for which the central subsidies 
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would not produce results. In the latter areas, the state will have to develop special 
programs to enable those regions to use the grants effectively. 
Regression analysis 
I used the data from 2000 for the analysis.  
First, I grouped the municipalities in order to create the appropriate sized 
units for the analysis. Choices for the grouping variable were the region (or other 
smaller territorial unit) or the size of the municipality. After examining the 
possibilities, I decided to create models for (i) the regions, (ii) the groups created 
based on the size of the municipalities, and (iii) the development groups of micro 
regions.  
 
The result is that the model works best in the groups based on the 
population of the municipalities.  
When evaluating the results, we take into account the values of the F-test 
that serves for checking the correspondence the model, and the values of the T-test, 
that is for checking the parameters of the equations. Another important element of 
the examination of the model is checking the R2, which is the explained deviation. 
In the groups based on the population of the municipalities the significance 
levels are below 0,05 (even 0,01) in most cases, so the zero hypothesis of the 
regression analysis, according to which there is no relationship between the 
independent variables and the dependent variable, does not apply. 
The effects of the change of the variables are different in the different 
groups. In municipalities smaller than 10000 inhabitants, the independent variables 
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explain 25-50% of the deviations of the dependent variable, while in the bigger 
municipalities, they explain as much as 80-90%. 
 
This result leads to the conclusion that the interdependence structure of the 
variables is more complicated in the case of smaller municipalities than in the case 
of bigger municipalities. If the state would want to raise the investment level of 
municipalities, it could do so by changing one or more of the independent variables 
(the local tax policy, central subsidies, loans). 
As a consequence, when the extent and the direction of the effect of the 
independent variables are examined, we can see that municipalities below and 
above 10000 inhabitants should be distinguished. 
The rise in the amount of local taxes and central subsidies usually means a 
rise in the investment rate in both groups. 
The loan activity has different effects in the case of smaller municipalities 
and in the case of bigger municipalities. While in the smaller municipalities the rise 
in the amount of loans means a rise in the investment activity, in the bigger 
municipalities the result is just the opposite. If a municipality has more loans, it is 
more likely that it will have a lower investment rate. 
The reasons are (i) the difference among the financial resources available to 
the two groups, (ii) the preferences of the central subsidy policy and (iii) the 
expenditure structure of investments.  
- Bigger municipalities usually have more income from the 
business turnover tax than smaller ones and they also have the 
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opportunity to co-operate with private companies in 
infrastructure projects. These options are not available for small 
municipalities, meaning that smaller municipalities have to take 
out loans in order to substitute for these sources of financing. 
- A minimum requirement for receiving state subsidies for 
investments is a population served by the asset of a minimum of 
10000 people. The big municipalities easily meet this 
requirement, while the smaller ones have to form municipal 
associations, which takes time and energy. (As the population of 
65% of municipalities is below 3000, many municipalities have 
to co-operate with at least two other partners.) 
- Big investments have high fixed costs, which put a bigger 
burden on the budget of a smaller municipality. Thus, when 
smaller municipalities start investments, they are more likely to 
have cash-flow problems, and may have to take out loans later in 
the project for financing other municipal tasks. 
 
The municipal loan guarantee institutions 
Based on the conclusions of the reserch, municipal investment behaviour 
depends mostly on the size of the municipality, and in 95% of municipalities there 
is a positive relationship between the long-term loans of the municipality and its 
investment rate. This means that the creation of an institution enhancing municipal 
credit market activity would also have a positive effect on municipal investments. 
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The setting up of this institution is in the interest of municipalities, banks 
with municipal clients and the state itself. 
The most important characteristic of the guarantee institution is mutuality. 
Co-operation between municipalities creates stronger actors in the market than they 
would comprise separately, if they acted individually in the marketplace. As a 
consequence they could negotiate better loan conditions.  
A highly criticised element of lending activity is the fact that collateral for 
loans may consist of immobile assets not directly related to the purpose of the 
loans. One advantage of creating the municipal guarantee institution is that these 
municipal assets could be used for other purposes or could be sold. Although in the 
past one trend was to create entrepreneur municipalities, this has lately been 
criticised, because municipal enterprises are often too risky, and they take away the 
municipality’s capacity from obligatory tasks, making its operation less efficient. 
With this kind of guarantee, the administrative costs of the loans would 
decrease, as the risks would be spread out among several actors on the market. As 
the municipalities are responsible for each other’s debt (mutuality), they would 
force each other to be more diligent, which would lead to more secure municipal 
debt and better financial management.  
Based on international experience a two-level system would best serve the 
enhancement of municipal credit market participation. The first level would consist 
of the guarantee institutions of municipalities, while the second level would be a 
state counter-guarantee fund. 
The task of the guarantee institutions would be to guarantee the loans of 
member municipalities.  
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The state guarantee fund would stand behind the guarantee institutions. This 
is in accordance with the international practice, and Hungary also provides a 
positive example, as the Small Entrepreneurs’ Guarantee Fund functioned this way. 
This is also in accordance with EU rules, as it is possible to get financing from the 
Structural Funds for the purpose of establishing and replenishing guarantee funds 
of the member states.  
The assets of the fund would not be divided among the guarantee 
institutions, but its balance would be calculated based on the accumulated need of 
the member institutions. 
The state counter-guarantee fund would be owned by the state. 
The guarantee institutions would be owned by the municipalities and others, 
such as the state and representatives of the banking sector. The advantage to 
municipalities to participate in the institution is a high level guarantee on their 
loans. The banks’ interest is to enforce safe lending and guarantee rules that 
harmonise with their business policy, and the state’s interest is to manage risk and 
minimise the losses of the guarantee fund. 
In order to enhance municipal ownership, the guarantee service would be 
offered only to the member (owner) municipalities. 
No matter what form this institution will take, it will only be a tool for 
mobilizing the Hungarian municipal credit market. It will not be able solve the 
investment financing problems of small municipalities by itself.  
In order to solve the infrastructure development problems of small 
municipalities, the state needs to make complex projects that involve the 
improvement of the revenue raising capacity of municipalities, that help in pre-
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financing of municipal infrastructure projects and that provide an incentive for 
enhanced municipal co-operation. The municipal guarantee institution could only 
be a step, an important tool in the realisation of this state program. 
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Appendix I. 
 
Appendix I. / A. 
  
TARKI questionnaire, 1999 autumn (Translated by the staff of TÁRKI) 
 
 
The data of the municipality 
 
1.) The name of the municipality (in the capital the number of the district): 
 
......................................... 
 
 
2.) County 
 
1 - Bács-Kiskun   8 - Hajdu-Bihar   15 - Szabolcs-Szatmár 
2 - Baranya   9 - Heves   16 - Tolna 
3 - Békés            10 - Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 17 - Vas 
4 - Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén    11 - Komárom-Esztergom  18 - Veszprém 
5 - Csongrád             12 - Nógrád   19 - Zala 
6 - Fejér              13 - Pest 
7 - Győr-Moson-Sopron        14 - Somogy   20 - Budapest 
 
 
Budget questions 
 
3.) Please assess the next year’s 
  
 Million (local 
currency) 
Total income of the municipality  
Borrowing for longer than one year (both for operating and 
investment purposes) 
 
The expenses on maintenance and developing of the assets   
 
 
4.) Is the municipality planning new investments in the following sector? 
 
 Not Planned 
Healthcare 0 
Education 0 
Water, sewage, pipe system 0 
Disposal sites 0 
Building roads 0 
Gas provision 0 
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5.) Which of the following sources do you plan to involve into the financing of the above 
investments? 
 
 Yes No 
Targeted subsidies 1 0 
Other central subsidies 1 0 
International sources (for example Phare)  1 0 
Regional, county subsidy 1 0 
Fees 1 0 
Private sector (concession) 1 0 
Loan (investment loan, bonds, mortgage) 1 0 
 
 
6.) Please assess, what is going to be the inflation rate in 1999? 
................. % 
 
6.) a. Please assess what is going to be the inflation rate in 2000? 
................. % 
 
7. Please assess, the next year in your municipality 
 
 Will grow Will not change Will increase
...the number of inhabitants 0 1 2 
... the umber of unemployed 0 1 2 
... the number of people on allowances 0 1 2 
... the number of public employees 0 1 2 
 
 
 
8.) During the next year… 
 
  Will be 
easier 
Will not 
change 
Will be 
more 
difficult 
1. ... Borrowing (terms, coverage, etc.) 0 1 2 
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2. ... getting investment subsidies from the 
state (including funds) 
0 1 2 
 
 
 
Attitudes, opinions 
 
Please, give your appreciation... 
9.) ... on the situation of Hungarian economy using the ten grades scale below: 
                Vary bad   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10   Very good 
 
10.) ... on the future situation of Hungarian economy during the next year 
                will be far worse 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10   will be much better 
 
11.) ... on the economic situation of your local government 
                    very bad  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  very good 
 
12.) ... on the future economic situation of your L. G. during next year 
                    will be far worse  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 will be much better 
 
13.) What do you think on the opinion of locals on the local government's activity? 
                Very bad  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  Very good 
 
14.) In your opinion, in which direction the local opinion will change on the local 
government's activity? 
                will be far worse  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  will be much better 
 
 
15.) What percentage of the PIT do you think should be redistributed to the local level? 
….................................……% 
 
 
 
Public Service Delivery 
 
16.) 
The range of the public service which will be analysed: 
1.  water, sewer 
2.  waste management (disposal and collection) 
3.  local public finance 
4.  district heating 
 
17.) WHAT IS THE SERVISE PROVISION METHOD IN YOUR MUNICIPALITIES? 
a.  municipality 
b.  municipal company (majority is on the hand of municipality) 
c.  company or other organisation owned by other municipality ( majority is on the hand of other 
municipality) 
d.  state owned company (majority is on the hand of state) 
e.  private company (majority is on the hand of private company) 
f.  other form 
 
18.). IS THERE A CONTRACT WITH THE SERVICE PROVIDER? 
a.  yes  
b.  no 
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WHEN WAS IT SIGNED: ______ year  
WHENT WILL IT BE EXPIRED: _____year, or INDEFINED 
 
19.) WHO OWNS THE EQUIPMENT AND REAL PROPERTIES REQUIRED FOR THE 
SERVICE PROVISION? 
a.  most assets is on the hand of the municipality 
b.  most assets is on the hand of the provider 
 
WHO MANAGES THE ASSET OF THE MUNICIPALITY 
a.  municipality 
b.  the service provide within management contract or concession WITHOUT INVESTMENT 
REQUIREMENT  
c.  the service provide within management contract or concession WITH INVESTMENT 
REQUIREMENT 
d.  other 
 
 IS THERE SERVICE CHARGE?  
a.  no (e.g. if it is financed through communal tax) 
b.  yes, the municipality collects the fees  
c.  yes, the provider collects the fees 
 
 ON WHAT METHOD IS THE CHARGE REGULATED? 
a.  the municipality sets the price based on detailed budget analysis, annually 
b.  the municipality adjusts the former year price with a defined formula (formula based finance) 
c.  other 
 
 
LOGIN QUESTIONS 
20.)  Do you have at your local government... 
... computer? 
... computer network? 
... e-mail address? 
... informatic expert in part or full time job? 
 
 
21.) Is there on the territory of your municipality an open-air market?  (Any daily or weekly market 
or fair, with or without license on which at least 10-20 trader sell their goods.) 
 
 
IF YES: 21.1)  How many such places are there?    ................ 
  0 – none 
 
 
If there are more than one open-air market on the territory of the municipality, think 
of the largest one! 
 
22) On an average day, usually how many stalls, tables, tents are there on the open-air market? 
 
About. ........  
 
23.) How many months is this open-air market open annually? 
 
.......   months 
 
24.) On which days is this open-air market open? 
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Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
25.) At what time does the open-air market open and close? 
 
Opens at ........ o’clock 
Closes at     ........ o’clock 
 
 
 
26.) Are there at the municipality jobs in which black labour is common? 
 
     26.1) – yes, such as: 
     ...................................................................... 
    
    ....................................................................... 
      1 - no 
 
26.2) IF YES: Where are the black workers usually recruited? 
 Yes No
In pubs 2 1 
In espressos 2 1 
On certain squares or streets 2 1 
Close to the Railway or bus stations 2 1 
At the outskirts or fringes of the municipality 2 1 
On the open-air market 2 1 
Other, through personal networks 2 1 
 
 
27) What are the highest and lowest wages? 
 
 
 HOURLY  OR DAILY WAGE   
 MINIMUM MAXIMUM MINIMUM MAXIMUM   
       
Mason .........Ft/hour .........Ft/hour ...............Ft/day ...............Ft/day
Agricultural day labourer 
.........Ft/hour .........Ft/hour ...............Ft/day ...............Ft/day
Unskilled labourer in 
construction .........Ft/hour .........Ft/hour ...............Ft/day ...............Ft/day
 
 
 
28.) How many active inhabitants are live in the municipality? 
 
       ........ persons 
 
29.) Among them approximately how many work 
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 - in an other municipality (commuters)  ......... persons 
 - abroad?     ......... persons 
 
 
Thank you! 
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The distribution of the answers based on the size of the municipality 
  
 N % 
– 1.000  599 61 
1.000 – 2.000 190 19 
2.000 – 5.000 120 12 
5.000 – 10.000 33 3 
10.000 – 34 3 
 976 100 
 
 
The distribution of the answers based on the per capita budget of the municipality  
 N % 
Operating municipalities 298 31 
Medium investors  342 36 
Big investors 309 33 
 949 100 
 
 
The distribution of the answers based on the investment activity of the municipality  
 N % 
Poor municipalities  204 21,5 
Average municipalities  400 42,1 
Rich municipalities  345 36,4 
 949 100 
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Appendix I. / B.  
 
The questions about the municipal expectations and municipal budget in the TARKI 
questionnaire, 2000 autumn (Translated by the staff of TÁRKI) 
 
 
 
1.) The name of the municipality (in the capital the number of the district): 
 
......................................... 
 
 
2.) County 
 
1 - Bács-Kiskun   8 - Hajdu-Bihar   15 - Szabolcs-Szatmár 
2 - Baranya   9 - Heves   16 - Tolna 
3 - Békés   10 - Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 17 - Vas 
4 - Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén    11 - Komárom-Esztergom  18 - Veszprém 
5 - Csongrád             12 - Nógrád   19 - Zala 
6 - Fejér              13 - Pest 
7 - Győr-Moson-Sopron    14 - Somogy   20 - Budapest 
 
 
3. Please assess the inflation in 2000?   ..................... % 
 
4. Please, give your appreciation... 
 ... on the situation of Hungarian economy using the ten grades scale below: 
Very bad   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10   Very good 
 ... on the economic situation of your local government 
  Very bad   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10   Very good 
  
5. Please, give your appreciation... 
 
 ... on the future situation of Hungarian economy during the next year 
will be far worse 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10   will be much better 
 
... on the future economic situation of your L. G. during next year 
                    will be far worse  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 will be much better 
 
6.  In your municipality in 2000 the expenses in the following sectors will be (Million HUF) 
 
Sector Salaries Buying assets Giving subsidies to other service provider 
Education    
Healthcare    
Social sector    
Administration    
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7. Please assess next year’s. 
Municipal income and expenditures In 2000  
(million HUF) 
In 2001 (please sign with and X) 
  Will 
increase  
Will 
decrease 
Will not 
change 
Current income     
• PIT income     
• Normatives     
• Tax on tourism and tax on business 
turnover  
    
• Communal and property tax     
Investment revenues     
• Privatization income     
• Income from financial investments     
• State grants     
Current expenditures     
Investment expenditures     
• Renovations      
Longer than one –year term loans     
Total loans     
 
8. if you plan the following investment, do you plan it as part of an association or individually? 
 Association Individually Not planned 
Healthcare 2 1 0 
Education 2 1 0 
Water and sewage 2 1 0 
Garbage treatment 2 1 0 
Roads 2 1 0 
Gas service 2 1 0 
 
9. Do you agree with the following? 
 
 Yes  No 
Associations are better because … 
… operation is easier   
… starting the investment is easier   
… grants are easily accessible   
Associations are not good because … 
… responsibility is not shared   
… no arguing with other municipalities   
… the municipality itself is big enough to use the whole capacity of a plant   
 
10. Do you plan to involve the following sources? 
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 Yes No 
Targeted subsidy 1 0 
Other central subsidy 1 0 
International grant 1 0 
Regional grant 1 0 
Citizen’s participation 1 0 
Involving private partners 1 0 
Loans 1 0 
Privatizing assets 1 0 
 
 
11. What is the guarantee of municipal loans? 
  
immobile assets 
service fee 
tax income  
 
12. Did the municipality have targeted grants in 1999? 
 
1 – yes   0 – no 
 
If yes, than … (please, sign with an X)
… could use much more half of it  
… could use about half of it  
… could use much less than half of it  
 
13. Do you agree with the following?  
 
The next year Yes No 
... the municipality will decrease the  number of its institutions 1 0 
... will be more difficult to get loans 1 0 
... will be more difficult to get  1 0 
…the amount of central subsidies will decrease 1 0 
 1 0 
 
 
14. Do you agree introducing value based property tax if…?  
 Yes  No 
… the PIT would decrease 1 0 
… the obligatory tasks of municipalities would 
increase 
1 0 
… the quality of service provision would increase 1 0 
 
 
15. Do you agree with the following?  
 incr
ease
decrease Will not 
change 
Did not have 
loans 
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…the amount of loans in 2000 compared to 
the previous years’  
1 2 3 0 
… the interest on loans in 2000 compared to 
the previous years’ 
1 2 3 0 
… the term of loans in 2000 compared to the 
previous years’ 
1 2 3 0 
 
 
16. If in 1999 you had targeted grants in the budget, the municipality could use …  
 
1 – did not have any targeted grants. 
2 – could use more than 70% of it. 
3 – could use between 30 and 70% of it. 
4 – could use less then 30% of it. 
5 – could not use it at all. 
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The distribution of answers according to the size of the municipality 
 
 N % 
Below 1 000  408 54 
Between 1 and  2 000  162 22 
Between 2 and 10 000  128 17 
Above 10 000  49 7 
 747 100 
 
The distribution of answers according to the per capita budget of the municipality 
 N % 
Poor municipalities  425 63 
Average municipalities  126 19 
Rich municipalities  119 18 
 670 100 
 
 
The distribution of answers according to the investment activity of the municipality 
 N % 
Operating municipalities 171 29 
Medium investors  279 47 
Big investors 141 24 
 591 100 
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Appendix II.  
 
THE MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF MUNICIPAL LOANS 
 
Borrowing from banks has been developed in Europe, where the 
relationship between local Savings Banks and municipalities has a long tradition. 
Because of this tradition, some of these banks specialised for offering a wide range 
of municipal services, such as planning, capital and cash management, and are able 
to do that at a lower price than its new competitors. 
There is another reason, why borrowing from the local bank seems to be an 
obvious solution. Because it has most information about the financial strength of 
the municipality, in case of late payment, the bank is in an easy situation to 
foreclose upon the municipal assets or garnish payments coming from the central 
budget. 
Despite the positive side, this practice has at least one disadvantage too. If 
the municipality does not have the opportunity to change to other service provider, 
the bank, relying on its monopol status without competition, can charge higher 
interest rates and fees. 
This can be avoided by enabling the municipalities to tender financial 
services. Municipalities must be able to compare the different offers, must be able 
to choose among them. They should not choose financing forms that are too 
expensive, and have to follow cash management policies that stop the 
overspending.  
 
The following list contains the information based on which municipalities 
can differentiate among the numerous bank offers. 
 
The interest rate 
The calculation method usually contains a formula based on interest rates of 
international banks (BUBOR, LIBOR, and EURIBOR) or the interest rate of the 
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national bank. Loans with longer term have higher interest rates, which can be 
explained by the higher risk the investor is taking. While the money is being used 
by the municipality (or by its company) the investor cannot have access to it. Long 
term fixed interest rates are rare in the Hungarian market. 
 
 
Costs and fees 
Different banks work with different fees. These cover contracting fees, 
writing official statements, transfer fees, fee of line of credit, which, above the 
capital and interest payments are the obligation of the borrower, so they should be 
treated as part of the debt service. These fees can sum up to 1-1,5% of the loan.  
 
Term of the loan 
The maximum maturity of loans in Hungary is 8-10 years. The short-term 
loans finance temporary disbalances due the operational deficits or finance the start 
up costs of a project. If a municipality wants to finance an investment with a series 
of short-term loans, it has to face with the risk that the interest rates will increase. 
 
 
Grace period 
The start up of the project is the most expensive phase of the investments, 
while it is not able to generate revenue yet. The grace period means that the 
repayment of the capital is postponed for a specific amount of time, until the 
investment generates revenues. It is usually a basis for negotiation and can be a 
criteria for setting priorities among the offers. The long grace period, on the other 
hand, can be harmful for the municipal creditworthiness as delays the repayment of 
the loan, thus making the conditions of the subsequent loans less favourable. We 
can say that in generally, the first quarter of the maturity can be the grace period. 
 
Guarantees 
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The question of guarantees discussed many times by the literature of this 
topic. In Hungary, the backing of loans is generally municipal asset, which is rarely 
related to the investment financed from the loan. This practice is criticised for 
many reasons. First, municipal assets that are not serving municipal tasks should be 
sold, so that their management does not decreases the municipal capacity. If other 
municipal income e.g. taxes or fees arrive to account of the lender bank, and the 
tax-abatement is possible, it is a safer transaction for the bank and burdening the 
assets is not necessary. Municipal assets that are directly tied to the provision of an 
obligatory service cannot be burdened in Hungary under any circumstances. 
 
The cash flow of the loan 
The cash flow of the loan means the money movements related to the loan 
(see above), the structure of capital and interest repayments. The repayment 
structure influences significantly the real value of the debt service. Loans with the 
different cash flows can be are very similar to the bonds. Hungarian bonds are 
really bank loans, as normally, this is the bank that buys the bonds, and the 
conditions are very similar to that of the bank loans.1  
 
Possibilities of subsidized interests 
Some banks work together with the government sector to provide 
subsidized loans, e. g. the interest subsidy on loans for investment in the tourism. 
In this case, the government, instead of subsidizing the municipality (the municipal 
loan) directly, subsidizes the bank. It is worth asking for information about 
subsidised loan programs at the different banks. 
 
Other information 
Any information containing the bank’s special terms and conditions. 
 
                                                     
1 This situation will change when the secondary market of the bonds will exist, and anyone will be 
able to buy municipal bonds. Since the  new act on Securities is in force, no open municipal bond 
issues has happened.  
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Appendix III.  
 
Table III-1. Municipal expectations in the regions * 
 
 Central-
Hungary 
Central-
Transdanubia 
Western-
Transdanubia
Southern-
Transdanub
ia 
Northern- 
Hungary 
Northern-
Great Plain 
Decrease the 
number of 
institutions 
(N) 
5 13 21 13 28 8 
% 13,2 14,4 14,9 9,2 21,7 10 
It will be 
more difficult 
to raise loans 
(N) 
14 47 63 82 84 42 
% 47,2 52,2 49,2 61,2 67,2 56 
It will be 
more difficult 
to acquire 
central 
investment 
subsidies (N)
35 75 113 121 110 71 
% 89,7 81,5 80,1 84 85,3 81,6 
It will be 
more difficult 
to acquire 
central 
operating 
subsidies (N)
34 80 113 125 114 76 
% 85 86 76,9 85,6 85,7 83,5 
The level of 
local taxes 
will increase 
(N) 
20 42 55 49 41 25 
% 51,3 45,2 37,4 33,1 30,8 28,1 
* The percentage data means the percentages within the groups 
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Table III-2. Municipal expectations in the groups based on the investment activity 
* 
 Operating  Medium investors  Big investors 
Decrease the number of institutions (N) 22 38 23 
% 14 14,7 28 
It will be more difficult to raise loans (N) 97 131 57 
% 64,2 53 50 
It will be more difficult to acquire central 
investment subsidies (N) 
136 214 103 
% 84,5 82 80,5 
It will be more difficult to acquire central operating 
subsidies (N) 
141 222 109 
% 86,5 83,5 82 
The level of local taxes will increase (N) 50 109 51 
% 30,7 40,2 38,9 
* The percentage data means the percentages within the groups 
 
 
Table III-3. Municipal expectations in the groups based on the per capita budget * 
 
 Poor  Average  Rich  
Decrease the number of institutions (N) 15 17 18 
% 19 14,3 16,2 
It will be more difficult to raise loans (N) 49 60 57 
% 62 52,2 54,3 
It will be more difficult to acquire central investment subsidies (N) 73 95 87 
% 86,9 79,8 79,1 
It will be more difficult to acquire central operating subsidies (N) 79 101 93 
% 92,9 82,1 83,8 
The level of local taxes will increase (N) 33 46 51 
% 38,4 37,4 44,7 
* The percentage data means the percentages within the groups 
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Table III-4. Municipal expectations in the groups based on the number of 
inhabitants * 
 
 - 1000 1-2,000 2-5,000 5-10,000 10-20,000 20-50,000 50-
100,000 
100,000-
Decrease the 
number of 
institutions (N) 
63 15 15 4 3 3 1 1 
% 15 11 17 14 26 44 36 60 
It will be more 
difficult to raise 
loans (N) 
245 63 41 9 4 1 1 - 
% 62 50 51 39 41 23 18 - 
It will be more 
difficult to 
acquire central 
investment 
subsidies (N) 
355 114 67 19 9 6 2 0 
% 83 84 84 81 77 84 66 20 
It will be more 
difficult to 
acquire central 
operating 
subsidies (N) 
355 121 73 22 11 6 3 1 
% 81 87 83 90 88 84 100 54 
The level of 
local taxes will 
increase (N) 
138 55 46 15 3 4 1 1 
% 31,8 41,4 54 56,6 25 52 30 43 
* The percentage data means the percentages within the groups 
 
 
Table III-5. Municipal expectations in the groups based on the investment activity 
* 
 Operating Medium investors Big investors
The situation of the national economy 4.95 4.95 5.21 
The local economic situation 3.88 3.9 4.04 
The change of the situations of the national 
economy 
5.21 5.16 5.17 
The change of the situations of the local economy 3.9 3.82 4.14 
* The percentage data means the percentages within the groups 
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Table III-6. Municipal expectations in the groups based on the per capita budget* 
 
 Poor Average Rich 
The situation of the national economy 5.16 5.13 5.05 
The local economic situation 3.82 3.83 3.89 
The change of the situations of the national economy 5.23 5.37 5.45 
The change of the situations of the local economy 3.84 3.82 3.92 
* The percentage data means the percentages within the groups 
 
 
Table III-7. Municipal expectations in the regions* 
 
 Central-
Hungary 
Central-
Transdanubia
Western-
Transdanubia
Southern
-
Transdan
ubia 
Northern
- 
Hungary 
Northern 
Great 
Plain  
Southern 
Great 
Plain 
The situation of the 
national economy 
5.34 5.21 5.12 4.76 4.47 5.14 5.02 
The local economic 
situation 
4.15 3.93 3.97 4.04 3.42 3.86 3.73 
The change of the 
situations of the 
national economy 
5.51 5.41 5.12 4.84 4.87 5.35 5.33 
The change of the 
situations of the local 
economy 
4.19 3.88 3.82 3.96 3.43 3.92 3.79 
* The percentage data means the percentages within the groups 
 
 
Table III-8. Municipal expectations in the groups based on the number of inhabitants * 
 
 -1,000 1-2,000 2-5,000 5-
10,000
10-
20,000
20-
50,000 
50-
100,000 
100,00
0- 
The situation of the 
national economy 
4.86 4.12 5.11 5.66 5.47 5.63 6.28 5.66 
The local economic 
situation 
3.74 4.08 3.96 4.04 4.22 3.67 4.81 4.08 
The change of the 
situations of the 
national economy 
5.02 5.27 5.29 5.77 5.48 5.44 6.72 5.25 
The change of the 
situations of the local 
economy 
3.43 3.91 3.9 4.15 4.34 4.08 4.43 3.71 
* The percentage data means the percentages within the groups 
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Appendix VI.  
 
Table IV-1. The expected change of the current revenues in the regions  
 
 Central-
Hungary 
Central-
Transdanu
bia 
Western-
Transdanu
bia 
Southern-
Transdanu
bia 
Northern- 
Hungary 
Northern 
Great 
Plain 
Southern 
Great 
Plain 
 
Increase 23 37 65 68 59 49 31 332
Coloumn 
% 
0,79 0,56 0,59 0,61 0,58 0,71 0,67  
Row % 0,07 0,11 0,2 0,20 0,18 0,15 0,09  
Decrease 3 15 19 10 14 9 7 77 
Coloumn 
% 
0,11 0,23 0,17 0,09 0,14 0,13 0,15  
Row % 0,04 0,19 0,25 0,13 0,18 0,12 0,09  
Will not 
change 
3 14 26 34 28 11 8 124
Coloumn 
% 
0,11 0,21 0,24 0,30 0,28 0,16 0,17  
Row % 0,02 0,11 0,21 0,27 0,23 0,09 0,06  
 29 66 110 112 101 69 46 533
 
 
Table IV-2. The expected change of the current revenues in the groups based on the 
per capita budget  
 
 Poor  Average  Rich   
Increase 43 80 65 188 
Coloumn % 0,52 0,73 0,6  
Row % 0,23 0,43 0,35  
Decrease  11 12 19 42 
Coloumn % 0,13 0,11 0,17  
Row % 0,26 0,29 0,45  
Will not change  28 18 25 71 
Coloumn % 0,34 0,16 0,23  
Row % 0,39 0,25 0,35  
 82 110 109 301 
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Table IV-3. The expected change of the current revenues in the groups based on the 
investment activity  
 
 Operating Medium investors Big investors  
Increase 75 149 73 297
Coloumn % 0,56 0,67 0,65  
Row % 0,23 0,50 0,25  
Decrease 19 29 16 64 
Coloumn % 0,14 0,13 0,14  
Row % 0,3 0,45 0,25  
Will not change 41 46 23 110
Coloumn % 0,30 0,21 0,21  
Row % 0,37 0,42 0,21  
 135 224 112 471
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Table V-1. The expected change of the PIT revenue in the regions  
 
 Central-
Hungary 
Central-
Transdanu
bia 
Western-
Transdanu
bia 
Southern-
Transdanu
bia 
Northern- 
Hungary 
Northern 
Great 
Plain  
Southern 
Great 
Plain 
 
Increase 29 63 68 85 73 60 43 421 
Coloumn 
% 
0,78 0,74 0,56 0,63 0,66 0,72 0,78  
Row % 0,09 0,19 0,20 0,25 0,22 0,18 0,13  
Decrease  2 7 20 11 7 11 3 61 
Coloumn 
% 
0,05 0,08 0,17 0,08 0,06 0,13 0,05  
Row % 0,03 0,09 0,26 0,14 0,09 0,14 0,04  
Will not 
change  
6 15 33 38 30 12 9 143 
Coloumn 
% 
0,16 0,18 0,27 0,28 0,27 0,14 0,16  
Row % 0,05 0,12 0,27 0,31 0,24 0,1 0,07  
 37 85 121 134 110 83 55 625 
 
 
Table V-2. The expected change of the PIT revenue in the groups based on the per 
capita budget  
 
 Poor  Average  Rich   
Increase 55 86 87 228 
Coloumn % 0,63 0,74 0,77  
Row % 0,24 0,38 0,38  
Decrease  11 12 5 28 
Coloumn % 0,13 0,10 0,04  
Row % 0,39 0,43 0,18  
Will not change  21 18 21 60 
Coloumn % 0,24 0,16 0,19  
Row % 0,35 0,3 0,35  
 87 116 113 316 
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Table V-3. The expected change of the PIT revenue in the groups based on the 
investment activity  
 
 Operating  Medium investors  Big investors  
Increase 105 188 84 377 
Coloumn % 0,67 0,73 0,66  
Row % 0,28 0,5 0,23  
Decrease  14 21 15 50 
Coloumn % 0,09 0,08 0,12  
Row % 0,28 0,42 0,3  
Will not change  37 49 29 115 
Coloumn % 0,24 0,19 0,23  
Row % 0,32 0,43 0,25  
 156 258 128 542 
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Table VI-1. The expected change of the revenue from the business turnover tax in 
the regions  
 
 Central-
Hungary 
Central-
Transdanu
bia 
Western-
Transdanu
bia 
Southern-
Transdanu
bia 
Northern- 
Hungary 
Northern 
Great 
Plaain  
Southern 
Great 
Plain 
 
Increase 45 22 32 30 31 26 22 208 
Coloumn 
% 
0,68 0,26 0,31 0,31 0,32 0,4 0,45  
Row % 0,22 0,11 0,15 0,14 0,15 0,135 0,11  
Decrease  8 27 18 11 25 10 7 106 
Coloumn 
% 
0,12 0,32 0,17 0,11 0,26 0,16 0,14  
Row % 0,08 0,25 0,17 0,10 0,24 0,09 0,07  
Will not 
change  
13 36 53 56 40 29 20 247 
Coloumn 
% 
0,2 0,42 0,51 0,58 0,42 0,45 0,41  
Row % 0,06 0,15 0,21 0,23 0,16 0,12 0,08  
 66 85 103 97 96 65 49 561 
 
 
Table VI-2. The expected change of the revenue from the business turnover tax in 
the groups based on the per capita budget  
 
 Poor  Average  Rich   
Increase 24 37 42 103 
Coloumn % 0,31 0,34 0,43  
Row % 0,23 0,36 0,41  
Decrease  15 18 18 51 
Coloumn % 0,19 0,17 0,19  
Row % 0,29 0,36 0,35  
Will not change  39 54 38 131 
Coloumn % 0,5 0,5 0,39  
Row % 0,3 0,41 0,29  
 78 109 98 285 
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Table VI-2. The expected change of the revenue from the business turnover tax in 
the groups based on the investment activity  
 
 Operating  Medium investors  Big investors  
Increase 45 77 37 159 
Coloumn % 0,33 0,36 0,33  
Row % 0,28 0,48 0,23  
Decrease  24 34 29 87 
Coloumn % 0,18 0,16 0,26  
Row % 0,28 0,39 0,33  
Will not change  66 103 47 216 
Coloumn % 0,49 0,48 0,42  
Row % 0,31 0,48 0,22  
 135 214 113 462 
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Table VII-1. The expected change of investment expenditures in the regions 
 
 Central-
Hungary 
Central-
Transdanu
bia 
Western-
Transdanu
bia 
Southern-
Transdanu
bia 
Northern- 
Hungary 
Northern 
Great 
Plain  
Southern 
Great 
Plain 
 
Increase 12 23 42 34 28 30 19 188 
Coloumn 
% 
0,36 0,29 0,4 0,29 0,27 0,4 0,36  
Row % 0,06 0,12 0,22 0,18 0,15 0,16 0,10  
Decrease  18 42 40 65 50 30 23 268 
Coloumn 
% 
0,55 0,54 0,38 0,55 0,49 0,4 0,43  
Row % 0,07 0,16 0,15 0,24 0,19 0,11 0,09  
Will not 
change  
3 13 23 20 25 15 12 111 
Coloumn 
% 
0,09 0,17 0,22 0,17 0,24 0,2 0,22  
Row % 0,03 0,12 0,21 0,18 0,23 0,14 0,11  
 33 78 105 119 103 75 54 567 
 
 
 
Table VII-2. The expected change of investment expenditures in the groups based 
on the per capita budget  
 
 Poor  Average  Rich   
Increase 30 33 30 93 
Coloumn % 0,41 0,29 0,28  
Row % 0,32 0,35 0,32  
Decrease  26 54 62 142 
Coloumn % 0,35 0,47 0,57  
Row % 0,18 0,38 0,44  
Will not change  18 28 17 63 
Coloumn % 0,24 0,24 0,16  
Row % 0,29 0,44 0,27  
 74 115 109 298 
 
 
 208
Table VII-3. The expected change of investment expenditures in the groups based 
on the investment activity 
 
 Operating  Medium investors  Big investors  
Increase 65 74 34 173 
Coloumn % 0,45 0,29 0,26  
Row % 0,38 0,43 0,2  
Decrease  44 132 79 255 
Coloumn % 0,30 0,51 0,61  
Row % 0,17 0,52 0,31  
Will not change  37 51 17 105 
Coloumn % 0,26 0,2 0,13  
Row % 0,35 0,49 0,16  
 146 257 130 533 
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Figure VIII-1. Municipal investment plans in 2000 
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Figure VIII-2. Municipal investment plans in 2000 in the groups based on the per 
capita budget. 
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Table IX-1. The sources of municipal investments in the municipal categories 
based on the per capita budget.  
 
 Poor  Average  Rich  
Targeted subsidies 45 70 79 
% 23 36 41 
Other central subsidies  54 76 86 
% 25 35 39 
International organizations 22 37 46 
% 21 35 43 
Regional subsidies 66 98 104 
% 25 37 39 
Citizens’ participation 38 55 64 
% 24 35 41 
Private sector 5 16 20 
% 12 39 49 
Loans 29 44 51 
% 23 35 41 
Privatization revenues 22 41 36 
% 22 41 36 
 
 
Table IX-2. The sources of municipal investments in the municipal categories 
based on the number of inhabitants*  
 
 Targeted 
subsidies  
Other 
central 
subsidies  
Internation
al 
organizati
ons 
Regional 
subsidies 
Citizens’ 
participati
on 
Private 
sector 
Loan
s 
Privatizati
on 
revenues 
 - 1000  239 241 123 343 182 43 116 87 
1-2,000 83 87 42 114 72 14 52 37 
2-5,000 56 60 23 69 50 12 28 28 
5-10,000 19 16 6 21 18 3 12 14 
10-20,000 11 10 8 11 10 5 7 7 
20-50,000 7 7 7 7 5 4 6 4 
50-
100,000 
3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 
100,000- 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
*Due to the small number of cases we do not show the percentages, the numbers mean the number 
of cases.  
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Table X-1. Municipal expectations about the long term loans in the regions 
 
 Central-
Hungary 
Central-
Transdanu
bia 
Western-
Transdanu
bia 
Southern-
Transdanu
bia 
Northern- 
Hungary 
Northern 
Great 
Plain  
Southern 
Great 
Plain 
 
Increase 4 17 10 19 24 16 8 98 
Coloumn 
% 
0,15 0,30 0,19 0,30 0,39 0,30 0,28  
Row % 0,04 0,17 0,10 0,2 0,24 0,16 0,08  
Decrease  11 14 19 12 13 17 8 94 
Coloumn 
% 
0,41 0,25 0,37 0,19 0,21 0,32 0,28  
Row % 0,11 0,15 0,20 0,13 0,14 0,18 0,09  
Will not 
change  
12 25 23 32 25 20 13 150 
Coloumn 
% 
0,44 0,47 0,44 0,51 0,40 0,38 0,45  
Row % 0,08 0,167 0,15 0,21 0,17 0,13 0,09  
 27 56 52 63 62 53 29 342 
 
 
Table X-2. Municipal expectations about the long-term loans in the groups based 
on the per capita budget 
 
 Poor  Average  Rich   
Increase 20 18 23 61 
Coloumn % 0,29 0,2 0,29  
Row % 0,33 0,3 0,38  
Decrease  12 31 25 68 
Coloumn % 0,17 0,34 0,32  
Row % 0,18 0,46 0,37  
Will not change  38 43 31 112 
Coloumn % 0,54 0,47 0,39  
Row % 0,34 0,38 0,28  
 70 92 79 241 
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Table X-3. Municipal expectations about the long-term loans in the groups based 
on the investment activity 
 
 Operating  Medium investors  Big investors  
Increase 28 43 16 87 
Coloumn % 0,34 0,29 0,22  
Row % 0,32 0,49 0,18  
Decrease  16 47 22 85 
Coloumn % 0,19 0,31 0,3  
Row % 0,19 0,55 0,26  
Will not change  39 60 36 135 
Coloumn % 0,47 0,4 0,49  
Row % 0,29 0,44 0,27  
 83 150 74 307 
Appendix XI.  
 
The correlation matrix of the factor analysis 
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Citizens1 1    
Citizens2 0.76 1    
Economy 0.29 0.36 1    
Econ change 0.28 0.41 0.83 1   
Nat economy 0.17 0.22 0.29 0.37 1   
Nat econ change 0.25 0.3 0.36 0.47 0.67 1   
Loans -0.09 -0.11 -0.07 -0.1 0.06 0.04 1   
Inflation -0.09 -0.14 -0.14 -0.19 -0.22 -0.3 0.1 1   
Unemployed -0.04 -0.05 -0.13 -0.19 -0.18 -0.28 -0.05 0.15 1   
Allowances -0.05 -0.1 -0.15 -0.21 -0.15 -0.21 0.02 0.08 0.55 1  
Institutions -0.06 -0.1 -0.12 -0.12 -0.06 -0.04 0.1 0.06 0 0.06 1  
Loans difficult -0.07 -0.11 -0.17 -0.23 -0.16 -0.24 -0.03 0.13 0.26 0.21 0.04 1  
Subsidies difficult -0.12 -0.12 -0.08 -0.17 -0.21 -0.26 0.02 0.13 0.1 0.2 -0.01 0.31 1  
Subsidy decrease -0.05 -0.1 -0.12 -0.23 -0.16 -0.24 0 0.13 0.13 0.18 0.01 0.2 0.39 1  
Status 0.08 0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.07 -0.07 -0.14 0.08 0.16 0 -0.24 0.13 0.05 0.01 1  
Region 0 -0.04 -0.08 -0.1 -0.06 -0.06 0.03 -0.02 0.21 0.19 0.05 0.02 -0.05 0.03 -0.06 1  
Investment 0 0 -0.01 0 0.02 0 0 0.04 -0.08 -0.07 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.02 0 0.02 1  
Long term loans -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 0.04 0.07 0.16 -0.05 -0.14 -0.09 0.11 0 -0.01 0.01 -0.44 0.02 0.16 1  
Loans/investments -0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.07 -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.07 0.02 -0.01 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.06 -0.01 0.31 1 
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Appendix XII.  
The reproduced correlation matrix of the factor analysis 
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Citizens1 0.86 -0.08 -0.04 -0.07 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.09 -0.05 0 -0.03 0 0.04 0.04 -0.02 0 0 -0.01 -0.08 
Citizens2 0.84 0.84 -0.07 -0.04 0.02 0 0.03 -0.07 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0 0.05 0 -0.04 -0.01 0 -0.02 -0.07 
Economy 0.33 0.43 0.76 0.07 -0.11 -0.1 0.07 0.1 0.05 0.01 0 0 -0.1 -0.1 0.05 0.03 -0.03 0.04 0.17 
Econ change 0.35 0.45 0.76 0.78 -0.11 -0.07 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.07 -0.1 0.05 0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.14 
Nat economy 0.14 0.2 0.4 0.s48 0.7 -0.03 -0.19 0.04 -0.02 -0.04 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.09 -0.04 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.08 
Nat econ change 0.23 0.3 0.46 0.54 0.7 0.74 -0.13 0.04 -0.03 -0.01 0.09 0.01 0.05 0.07 0 0.01 0.03 -0.04 -0.06 
Loans -0.1 -0.14 -0.15 -0.15 0.25 0.17 0.7 -0.22 -0.01 -0.02 -0.15 -0.05 0.01 0 0.02 0.06 -0.05 -0.01 0.02 
Inflation 0 -0.07 -0.24 -0.3 -0.27 -0.34 0.32 0.53 0.06 0.03 -0.06 -0.03 -0.08 -0.08 -0.06 0.06 -0.09 0.09 0.16 
Unemployed 0.01 -0.04 -0.18 -0.24 -0.16 -0.25 -0.04 0.09 0.68 -0.09 0 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.03 -0.19 0.03 0.1 0.04 
Allowances -0.04 -0.08 -0.17 -0.23 -0.11 -0.2 0.04 0.05 0.64 0.67 -0.02 -0.06 -0.03 -0.07 -0.24 -0.19 0.08 -0.11 0.04 
Institutions -0.03 -0.05 -0.11 -0.15 -0.14 -0.13 0.24 0.12 0 0.09 0.51 -0.15 0.02 -0.01 0.22 -0.03 0.19 -0.09 0.09 
Loans difficult -0.07 -0.1 -0.18 -0.25 -0.18 -0.25 0.03 0.16 0.32 0.36 -0.06 0.1 -0.12 -0.17 -0.03 0.03 0.05 0.01 -0.13 
Subsidies difficult -0.16 -0.16 0.15 -0.1 -0.23 -0.31 0 0.21 0.16 0.23 -0.02 0.42 0.66 -0.16 0.02 0.1 0 -0.04 -0.04 
Subsidy decrease -0.09 -0.1 -0.03 -0.13 -0.25 -0.31 0.01 0.21 0.19 0.25 0.02 0.43 0.55 0.19 0.03 0.08 -0.06 -0.07 -0.04 
Status 0.1 0.07 -0.09 -0.06 -0.33 -0.08 -0.17 0.14 0.19 0.03 -0.47 0.37 0.04 -0.02 0.73 0.08 0 0.08 0.03 
Region 0 -0.03 -0.11 -0.12 -0.04 -0.07 -0.04 -0.09 0.4 0.38 0.09 0.16 -0.16 -0.05 -0.14 0.56 -0.18 -0.06 0.08 
Investment 0 0 0.02 0.01 0 -0.03 -0.05 0.13 -0.11 -0.15 -0.21 0 0.02 0.08 0 0.19 0.82 -0.09 0.02 
Long term loans -0.03 -0.03 -0.09 -0.09 -0.07 0.11 0.16 -0.14 -0.24 -0.07 0.2 -0.07 0.03 0.08 -0.52 0.07 0.26 0.73 -0.12 
Loans/investments 0.07 0.06 -0.23 -0.21 0.05 0.08 0 -0.15 -0.12 -0.03 -0.1 -0.01 0.07 0.06 -0.02 -0.14 -0.03 0.43 0.67 
Below the diagonal is the reproduced correlation matrix, in the diagonal the communalities and above the diagonal the residuals.
Appendix XIII.  
The correlation matrix of the regression analysis  
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Current 
revenues 
1 0.7 0.26 0.72 0.79 0.63 0.02 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.01 0.72 
Normativ
es 
0.7 1 0.54 0.77 0.55 0.52 0.06 0.67 0.77 0.57 0.53 0.02 0.47
Business 
turnover 
tax and 
the tax on 
tourism 
0.25 0.54 1 0.37 0.07 0.09 0.5 0.06 0.3 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.1
Commun
al tax and 
property 
tax 
0.72 0.77 0.37 1 0.71 0.65 0.25 0.76 0.76 0.71 0.68 0.04 0.58
Investme
nt 
revenues 
0.79 0.55 0.07 0.71 1 0.73 0 0.89 0.85 0.9 0.98 0 0.68
Privatizat
ion 
revenues 
0.63 0.52 0.1 0.65 0.73 1 0 0.9 0.7 0.78 0.66 0.01 0.75
Revenue 
from 
financial 
investme
nts 
0.02 0.07 0.5 0.24 0 0 1 0 0.03 0 0 0 0
State 
investme
nt 
subsidies 
0.89 0.68 0.07 0.76 0.89 0.9 0 1 0.9 0.9 0.9 0 0.74
Current 
expenditu
res 
0.9 0.7 0.31 0.76 0.85 0.69 0.03 0.9 1 0.92 0.86 0.01 0.71
Investme
nt 
expenditu
res 
0.86 0.58 0.08 0.7 0.9 0.78 0 0.98 0.92 1 0.92 0.01 0.76
Expenditu
res on 
renovatio
ns 
0.8 0.5 0.07 0.68 0.9 0.6 0 0.9 0.86 0.92 1 0 0.7
Long 
term 
loans 
0.01 0.02 0.05 0.04 0 0.01 0 0 0.01 0.01 0 1 0.6
Sum of 
total loans 
0.72 0.4 0.1 0.57 0.68 0.75 0 0.74 0.71 0.76 0.7 0.6 1
 
 217
References 
 
 
Amborski, David P. [1998]: Review of the Regulatory Environment of Municipal 
Capital Borrowing. ICURR Press. Toronto, Ontario. pp. 15. 
Apatini, Kornélné – Barati, Izabella – Keményné, Koncz Ildikó. [2001]: Az 
önkormányzati garanciaprogram; Javaslat az önkormányzati 
garanciarendszer intézményi hátterének kidolgozására. Ed: Barati Izabella.  
The Prime Minister’s Office in Hungary. Budapest. 
Baar, Kenneth [2000]: CONTRACTING OUT LOCAL PUBLIC SERVICES IN A 
TRANSITION ECONOMY. World Bank, SNDP program. Budapest.. pp. 
10. 
Bahl, R.oy. [2000]: Intergovernmental Transfers in Developing Countries. 
Principles and Practice. World Bank. Háttértanulmány. Washington, D. C. 
pp. 2 
Barabás, Gyula – Hamecz, István – Neményi, Judit: A költségvetés finanszírozási 
rendszerének átalakítása és az eladósodás megfékezése. Közgazdasági 
Szemle, XLV. 1998. September. pp. 798. 
Barati, Izabella – Szalai, Ákos [1999]: Fiscal Decentralization. The Canadian 
Urban Institute. Toronto. 
Barati, Izabella [1999]: Önkormányzati hitelezés, hitelképesség. The Canadian 
Urban Institute.Toronto. 
Barati, Izabella [2000]: Az önkormányzati hitelfelvétel elősegítése - 
Önkormányzati garanciaalap. The Prime Minister’s Office in Hungary. 
Budapest 
Barati, Izabella, [2000]: The relationship between creditworthiness and local 
income. A paper for the Conference on „National Conference on Local 
Taxes and Fees” Sofia, 30 June 2000. 
Barati, Izabella. [2000]: Önkormányzati adatok 2000-ben. TÁRKI. Budapest. pp. 
14. 
 218
Barati, Jókay, Kálmán, Kopányi: Municipal Infrastructure Financing in Hungary: 
Four Cases, 1998. World Bank Background Paper 
Beluszky, Pál [2000]: A magyarországi településrendszer fejlődése. Magyarország 
településkörnyerzete. The Hungarian Science Academy. Budapest.  
Boadway, Robert – Kitchen, Harry. [1999] Canadian Tax Policy. Third Edition. 
Canadian Tax Foundation. Toronto.  
Boadway, Robin, Sandra Roberts and Anwar Shah [1994]: The Reform of Fiscal 
Systems in Developing and Emerging Market Economies: A Federalism 
Perspective. World Bank. Washington, DC. pp. 11-24. 
Claessens, Stijn and Simeon Djankov [1998]: Politicians and Firms in Seven 
Central and Eastern European countries. World Bank. Washington, D. C. 
pp. 7. 
Csatári, Bálint. [1996]: A MAGYARORSZÁGI KISTÉRSÉGEK NÉHÁNY 
JELLEGZETESSÉGE - Kistérségi folyamatok és a területfejlesztési 
politika lehetséges beavatkozási térségtipusai Magyarországon. Regional 
Research Center of the Hungarian Science Academy, Kecskemét. 
www.rkk.hu 
Csefkó, Ferenc [2000]: A központi és regionális fejlesztési szervek szerepe a 
régióépítésben.  
In: Magyarország területi szerkezete és folyamatai az ezredfordulón. Eds.: 
Horváth Gy., Rechnitzer J. MTA RKK. Pécs. pp. 93-111. 
Darche, Benjamin [1997]: Financing Mechanisms at the Subnational Level in 
Emerging Markets borrowings and Privatizations/concessions, World Bank. 
Washington, D.C. 
DEXIA – Credit local de France – Credit local de Belgium. [1999]: Local Finance 
in the Fifteen Countries of the European Union. DEXIA. Belgium. pp. 26 - 
29. 
Dr. Schimdt, Géza – Kadók, Ferencné – Herneczky, Frigyesné [1996]: 
Önkormányztai pénzügyi vezetők kézikönyve. NOVORG. Budapest. pp 37-
48. 
 219
EBRD and The European Commission Tanács [1999]: An evaluation of PHARE 
and TACIS Co-Financing Programmes. 
El Daher, Samir [1997]: Municipal Bond Markets, Experience of the USA. World 
Bank. Washington, D.C.  
Faluvégi, Albert: A magyar kistérségek fejlettségi különbségei. Területi Statisztika, 
3. (40.) 2000. 4. 319-346. p. 
Horváth M., Tamás – Szirmai, Viktória [2000]: Településmenedzsment. 
Magyarország településkörnyerzete. MTA. Budapest. 
Huther, Jeff and Anwar Shah [1998]: Applying a Simple Measure of Good 
Governance to the Debate on Fiscal Decentralization. World Bank, 
Washinton, D. C. pp.7. 10.  
Jenei, György [1999]: Establishment of an in independent, neutral civil service in 
the former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. in The 
Democratic Process and he Market. Ed. Simai Mihály. United Nations 
University Press. New York.  
Kerekes, Sándor – Kiss, Károly [1998]: EU-csatlakozásunk környezetvédelmi 
feltételei és következményei. Zöld Belépő. 59. Magyarország az 
ezredfordulón, MTA - BKE. Budapest. pp 23. 
Kopányi, Mihály et al. [2001]: Hungary. Modernizing the Subnational Government 
System. World Bank. Disscussion Paper. No. 417. Washington, D.C. 
McAully, Jack [1999]: Magyar önkormányzati hitelképesség, The Canadian Urban 
Institute. Toronto. 
Millward, Robert [1982]: The Comparative Performance and Public and Private 
Ownership. InEdward Roll (Ed.), The Mixed Economy, London, 
Macmillan. 
Musgrave, Richard A. [1983]: Who Should Tax, Where and What? In Tax 
Assignment in Federal Countries. Ed. Charles McLure. Australian National 
University Press. Canberra. 
Nevitt, Peter K.– Fabozzi, Frank: [1997]: Projektfinanszírozás, CO-NEX 
Könyvkiadó, Budapest.  pp. 19-39. 
 220
OCED [1999]: Sourcebook on Environmental Funds in Transition Economies. 
Paris.  
Péteri, Gábor –  Davey, Kenneth [1998]: A helyi önkormányzatok pénzügyi 
rendszer átalakítás lehetõségei. Helyi Önkormányzati Know-How Program.  
Nagykovácsi. 
Petersen, John E. [1999]: Sub-national Debt, Borrowing Process and 
Creditworthiness. World Bank, Washington, D.C. pp..5.  
Peterson, John E. [1996]: Using Municiapal Development Funds to Build 
Municiapl Credit Markets. World Bank. Washington, D.C. pp. 19. 
Peterson, John E.[1998]: Measuring Local Government Credit Risk and Improving 
Creditworthiness. World Bank. Washington, D. C. pp. 20. 
Shah, Anwar [1994]: The Reform of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in 
Developing Countries. World Bank, Washington, D. C. 
Shah, Anwar [1998]: Balance, Accountability, and Responsiveness: Lessons about 
Decentralization. World Bank. Washington, D.C.  
Szegvári, Péter: Mire valók a régiók és mire nem?. Ön-Kor-Kép. 1997/ 8. pp. 4-6. 
Tassonyi, Álmos and Bird, Richard M. [2000]: Constraints on Provincial and 
Municipal Borrowing in Canada: Markets, Rules and Norms. Canadian 
Public Administration. v.44, #1, p.84-119. 94. 
Ter-Minassian, Teresa [1996]: Borrowing by Sub-national Governments: Issues 
and Selected International Experience. IMF Paper on Policy Analysis and 
Assessment 9614, Washington, D.C. 
The European Council’s 1999. 21. June 1260/1999/EC decree on the Structural 
Funds  
The European Council’s 1999. 21. June 1263/1999/EC decree on the Fisheries 
Fund 
The European Council’s 1999. 21. June 1264/1999/EC decree on the amendment of 
1164/94/EC decree  
 221
The European Parlaiment and Council’s 1999. 21. June 1261/1999/EC decree on 
the European Regional Development Fund 
The Structural Funds and Their Coordination with the Cohesion Fund, Guidelines 
for programmes in rhe period for 2000-2006. European Commission, 1999. 
Varfalvi, István – Varga, Sándor – Ebel, Bob [1998]: Sorting out 
Intergovernmental roles and responsibilities. In. Bokros – Dethier: Public 
Finance Reform During the Transition: The experience of Hungary. World 
Bank. Washington, D.C.   
Wortzel, Heidi and Lawrence Wortzel [1989]: Privatization: Not the Only Answer. 
World Development, pp. 633-641. 
www.ksh.hu The homepage of the Central Statistical Office 
www.mfa.gov.hu/euanyag/gykerdes/top/4.html, The homepage of the Miunistry of 
Foreign Affaires of Hungary  
 
